The Arctic is important to Russia primarily because it offers the opportunity to regain great power status. The economic opportunities of the region provide the means through which Russia can increase its global clout. The region’s abundant resources can provide domestic economic growth and regime legitimacy, as well as increased control over global energy security. The Arctic Ocean as a shipping route would further increase influence and enable the growth of northern and eastern infrastructure. A domestically strong Russia in charge of an even more significant portion of the world’s energy resources would be a powerful force in global affairs. Thus, ideational factors can be identified as crucial to Russia’s motives in the Arctic. Furthermore, Russia is motivated by historically influenced defensive concerns about preventing others from establishing themselves in Russia’s neighbourhood, hence why Arctic military capabilities have been augmented. In addition to the other Arctic states, rivals include the increasingly vocal non-Arctic states such as the European Union (EU), China, and India. Yet, whilst an us-versus-them dynamic can be observed, Russia is also aware of the importance of cooperation in achieving its goals. In spite of some military sparring, Moscow has developed relationships with several Arctic states bilaterally and through international fora, although the United States remains elusive, even under the supposedly friendlier Trump administration. In reality, Russia’s actions are by no means abnormal compared to other Arctic states. It is acting in a way one would expect of a regional stakeholder and important global actor.

 

The melting sea ice provides Russia with an opportunity to take advantage of increased shipping along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which straddles its northern coastline. As shown by the 2010 “Arctic Strategy Document”, Russian officials are ‘planning to transport more than 10 times as much via the NSR’ and are encouraging foreign states and companies to choose the route.[1] The route could save the shipping industry billions of dollars a year and change the structure of global trade.[2] Recent Arctic voyages have saved $300,000 per ship and ten transit days, whilst carrying more cargo, compared to the 3,500 mile longer route through the Suez Canal.[3] The Suez route is vulnerable to closures such as after the Six-Day War in 1967, the chokepoint of the Malacca Straits between Malaysia and Indonesia,[4] and piracy off the Horn of Africa, which led to insurance costs increasing by 1000 percent between September 2008 and March 2009.[5] The NSR is not immune to piracy nor a chokepoint – the Bering Strait – but the threats are noticeably less. Thus, a more reliable Arctic passage would be enticing for international ports and shipping companies, which would provide Russia with control over a vital artery of global trade.[6] Such investment would also help the slowly increasing development of towns in northern and eastern Russia that became run-down after 1991, such as Tiksi, which lost 75 percent of its inhabitants.[7]

 

The amount of oil shipped through the Barents Sea increased by 1567 percent between 2004 and 2010.[8] However, cargo volume has since stabilised as plummeting oil prices and a focus on Crimea have reduced funds, which is compounded by shallower waters than other oceans and high operating costs that inherently come from a sparse population.[9] The passage may be commercially unprofitable in the short-term due to ‘high insurance premiums, lack of infrastructure, and harsh conditions’.[10] However, the increasing role of private companies in developing the region could begin to alleviate these issues.[11] A further problem arises from Russia regarding the passage as a national transport route under Russian jurisdiction, just as Canada does with the Canadian archipelago. President Putin created “The Northern Sea Route Administration of Russia” to set up strict environmental and navigational rules for vessels that include escorts by one of Russia’s 32 icebreakers and various fees.[12] Whether these rules remain stable and rewarding, unlike Siberian over-flight payments, will be critical to the success of the route. Yet, depending upon political developments, Russia may be forced to recognise the right of “innocent passage” as it did during the Cold War.[13]

 

The melting sea ice also renders the Arctic’s vast resources accessible. The United States Geological Survey estimated in 2008 that 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 44 million barrels of natural gas liquids and 90 billion barrels of oil are in the Arctic.[14] Countries from around the world are positioning their companies in order to exploit these resources, which offer ‘trillion-dollar business opportunities’[15] and an opportunity to alter the dynamics of global trade.[16] As a means to determine territory, the “United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea” (UNCLOS) enables a signatory to claim exclusive economic rights from its shore to a limit of 200 nautical miles – with potential to lay claim to an extra 150 miles – known as its “Exclusive Economic Zone”. Russia and other Arctic states have submitted proposals to extend their continental shelves in order to lay claim to potential riches. Russia claims the Lomonosov Ridge, which extends from Siberia up to the North Pole, but this is contested by Denmark, through Greenland, and Canada who both view the ridge as an extension of their landmasses.[17] Given Russia has the most extensive Arctic infrastructure of any state in the region, which provides ‘20 per cent of Russia’s gross domestic product’ (GDP), notably the port of Murmansk known as “Russia’s northern energy gateway”, it is well placed to exploit any resources.[18] Russia’s current territory would give it double the number of oil barrels of Saudi Arabia as well as control over vast fish stocks.[19] The energy sector accounts for ‘half of Russia’s national income and 65 percent of its foreign exchange earnings’[20], so it is not surprising that President Putin has described the Arctic as a strategic resource base with the potential to secure Russia’s ‘strategic, economic, scientific and defence interests’ by guaranteeing energy security.[21] This is pertinent given that Russia’s five largest natural gas fields are ‘depleting rapidly’.[22] Controlling energy supply is also a useful way for Russia to gain leverage with the EU, which strengthens the suggestion that controlling Arctic energy resources could be a strategic move as much as an economic one. Given its preponderance for the economy, it is also vital for internal economic stability and thus regime legitimacy. However, extraction will be very difficult and costly thereby requiring external, namely Western, technology and cooperation.

 

Russia is keen to cooperate with other countries in the Arctic. In return, it is important that Western states interact with Russia otherwise they will ‘reinforce Russia’s sense of strategic isolation and aggravate the security dilemma’.[23] Cooperation has a historic basis having been a key component of Mikhail Gorbachev’s plan to ‘strengthen cooperation in the Arctic region’ through various means such as the Soviet Union opening up the NSR.[24] Claims over resources can be a source of instability but in the Arctic Ocean their extraction will ‘require shared dialogue and stewardship from all of the Arctic coastal states’ due to the region’s difficult challenges.[25] There are various demographic, climatic, infrastructure and financial challenges that will require a massive investment of finance and energy,[26] shown by the oil giant Shell’s fruitless seven-year quest in the Chukchi Sea, which ended in 2015.[27] To overcome these challenges, Russia requires foreign expertise to exploit fields, as has been highlighted by Gazprom relenting in allowing foreign companies to participate in drilling with a promised share in the profits.[28] President Trump’s desire to develop fossil fuel production could lead to cooperation in this domain after President Obama’s focus upon climate change lead to much of the Arctic been put off limits for oil exploration. However, the Trump administration still supports sanctions over Crimea despite discussion of a “reset”.[29] Outside of the U.S., Russia has made progress in cooperating with its neighbours. Russian politicians from the Arctic region have welcomed resource cooperation with China in addition to the two countries’ already extensive energy ties.[30] Finland launched an Arctic partnership with Russia in 2010 in order to develop commercial ties in the region,[31] and despite supporting sanctions on Russia, has refrained from joining NATO.[32] Russia and Canada both view the Arctic as ‘national heritage’[33] and key to their identity ‘as a northern nation’.[34] Cooperation between the two includes the 1992 ‘Canada-Russia Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North’, a 2009 diplomatic meeting to discuss the region, and over forty-five Canadian sponsored projects in the Russian north relating to areas such as water management, economic development, and aboriginal peoples.[35] Norway and Russia have extensive business partnerships, which the Norwegian government have described as ‘greater than ever’,[36] and since 2009 have a formal “Bilateral Dialogue” on Arctic issues focussing on environmental issues that led to the resolution of the forty-year long dispute over an area of the Barents Sea known as “The Loophole”.[37] For further insight into cooperation, one could examine Antarctica, which although admittedly has differences due to its remoteness from mainland state territory, provides an example of international cooperation and peace through the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, signed during the height of the Cold War.

 

Global forums and international law have combined to provide the basis for cooperation. The Arctic Council (1996) features the eight Arctic states as permanent members and is moving towards ‘hard legislation’ having previously developed soft law recommendations after the United States prohibited it from addressing security concerns.[38] UNCLOS, although problematically unratified by the United States, combines with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) to manage maritime disputes, while the “United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf” deals with seabed disagreements. In addition, the Barents-Euro Arctic Council (1993), Standing Committee of the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (1994), and the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (1996) have provided platforms that prevent a serious escalation of disputes. Given the nature of the situation in which territory is difficult to demarcate and rival claims are unavoidable, these institutions have done rather well.[39] Therefore, despite strategic military activities, the high-level fora have ensured that tensions have remained low, as disputes have been dealt with in a largely amicable fashion even if deadlock has ensued.

 

Competition and mistrust is inevitable in a region ‘with such ambiguous ownership… and such extraordinary economic promise’.[40] With tantalising riches on offer it is unsurprising that Arctic states are trying to claim sovereign control over as much territory as they can. For Russia, claiming the Arctic as a sphere of influence is also part of a highly choreographed agenda to regain great power status and influence.[41] For some analysts, this creates a perception that the Cold War never ended in the Arctic Ocean, with states viewing the region through a Cold War lens.[42] Russian claims of foreign states’ ‘attempts to impose unfair competition’[43] and “the Arctic is ours and we should manifest our presence”[44] has led to a perception that Russia perceives international relations as a zero-sum game where one state’s interests is automatically in conflict with those of others.[45] Yet, repeated American claims that they have fallen far behind in an Arctic arms race suggests this is not a uniquely Russian phenomenon.[46] Relative gains, however, is not the only consideration. In many ways, Russia’s proactive Arctic policy is also as much a defensive measure as it is aggressive and greedy because whilst it perceives the Arctic as a place in which a rising power can assert itself they are also afraid that, as the Secretary of the Security Council said, ‘we will simply be forced out’.[47] A defensive mindset can be seen in how Russia, and the other Arctic states, have battled against competition from non-Arctic countries arguing for a “global commons” as these states are affected by Arctic climate change and shipping patterns.[48] Drawing upon critical geopolitics theory, China in particular argues that discursive structures need to change so that Arctic states do not monopolise access to the region.[49] Twelve non-Arctic states[50] have gained observership at the Arctic Council, which is seen as a symbolic acknowledgement of justified interests.[51] To counter non-Arctic states, the five coastal members signed the non-Arctic Council “Ilulissat Declaration” whilst both Canada and Russia have blocked the EU’s bid to join the Arctic Council. This highlights the lack of a unanimous Western position that can oppose Russia, thus enabling Moscow a greater degree of leverage and manoeuvrability. Canada disagrees with the U.S. over the Canadian archipelago, which it claims are internal waters whilst the U.S. says they are international straits.[52] The Arctic unites Canadians across the political spectrum[53] and passions have led to condemnation of the American ambassador and former Prime Minister Steven Harper stating that ‘if you’re in Canada’s Arctic you will be playing by Canada’s rules’.[54] Furthermore, Canada, like Russia, proposes the sector principle for demarcating Arctic territory, while the U.S. and EU are in favour of the median-line principle.[55]

 

In spite of its efforts towards cooperation, Russia has had a ‘habit of sending mixed messages – calling for cooperation, while blaming the West… for expansionism’.[56] In the Arctic, these mixed messages primarily mean militarisation. The region was the scene of military activity during the Cold War as nuclear submarines moved under the ice cap and American submarines penetrated the Sea of Okhotsk and Vladivostok harbour.[57] Under President Putin, Russia has greatly enhanced its military capabilities in the region with the Defence budget one of the few to be increased in recent years. Russia’s Northern Fleet, which is ‘deeply rooted in the culture of the Russian Federation as an important tool of foreign policy’,[58] has been developed and supported with a new Arctic command of four new Arctic brigade combat teams, 14 new operational airfields, 16 deepwater ports, and 40 icebreakers with 11 in development compared to the United States’ one.[59] The Trump administration complains that a new ground-launched SSC-8 cruise missile violates the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.[60] A 2014 exercise that involved 155,000 men and thousands of tanks, jets, and ships was claimed by the Russian Defence Ministry to be bigger than those carried out during the Cold War.[61] Since 2007, British and Norwegian fighter jets have regularly scrambled to intercept Russian warplanes that “buzz” their defences by flying extremely close to national borders, with 87 intercepted outside Norway in 2008.[62] Similar “buzzing” has also taken place in the Bering Strait.[63] Tensions with Norway increased after the Russian airforce carried out a mock bombing run against Norway’s northern command centre at Bodo and the ships, Severomorsk and Marshall Ustinov, moved into the Svalbard archipelago in 2008, leading to the Norwegian chief of the armed forces to expect an imminent Arctic confrontation.[64] Some Norwegian politicians feared that they were going to be subject to a Georgia-like attack.[65] A military build-up with increasingly aggressive rhetoric could lead to a small incident, such as an unwelcome intrusion in the NSR, spiralling out of control in a climate of mistrust WW1-like. The 1983 nuclear scare, described by American nuclear security expert Bruce Blair as ‘the closest our country has come to accidental nuclear war’,[66] provides a good example in which malfunctioning Soviet equipment anticipated incoming nuclear missiles. Given that the Norwegian coastguard opened fire on Icelandic vessels in 1994 after ongoing clashes, a violent escalation is not out of the realms of possibility.

 

Yet, whilst Russia may be increasing its military capabilities in the region, the reality is that ‘it would not be in Russia’s national interest to risk conflict in the Arctic unless it really had to’.[67] What counts as ‘really had to’ is debatable – the 1983 nuclear scare seems the most pertinent example – but it appears that the recent military build-up was ‘not built with combat in mind’.[68] Rather, it is more defensive and pre-emptive, as a way to monitor the region and prevent others from taking up a threatening position such as on Greenland or Svalbard, particularly as the withdrawal of the previously protective pack-ice leaves the highly sensitive northern flank exposed. This is not dissimilar to the United States’ fears of its ‘soft northern borders’ where it has suspicions of Canada’s ability to provide security and has had a radar system operational since 1955.[69] The German “Operation Wunderland II” of 1943 set up advanced bases on Novaya Zemlya and led to U-boats attacking targets in the Ob estuary, Kara Sea, and landing men as far east as Wardroper Island.[70] Historical fears of such attacks, from all angles, are important to consider,[71] and have prompted Russian claims of Western Arctic aggression.[72] Given that the United States ‘funds a navy as large as the next 17 in the world combined’[73] and Russia’s armed forces have been described as a ‘paper tiger’,[74] not to mention the need for foreign economic investment, it seems misleading to suggest that Russia is actively preparing for conflict. Fears of an attack on Spitsbergen, Crimea-like to seize disputed territory, are talked about but it is one thing to attack a Russian-leaning region of Ukraine, another to attack a NATO state. Furthermore, not all military activities are aggressive as was shown by the French-Russian military exercise with the ship Aleksandr Otrakovsk in 2012.[75] In reality, the other Arctic states have not acted very differently to Russia. Denmark and Canada are also expanding their Arctic military capabilities, the latter conducting annual military exercises named “Operation Nanook” since 2007. Thus, Russia’s military manoeuvres ‘should not be treated as something extraordinary’.[76] As the Norwegian Foreign Minister stated, Russia’s activities are ‘a return to a more normal level of activity for a major power with legitimate interests in the region’.[77] Therefore, Paul Berkman is correct in concluding that the ‘peaceful use of the Arctic does not have to equate with demilitarisation or restrictions on military operations that are otherwise permitted under international law’.[78]

 

In conclusion, the Arctic is important to Russia in a number of different ways. Primarily, the Arctic is a means to enhance Russia’s great power status and global relevance. Control of valuable natural resources and a potential new global transit route will provide greater power in international affairs, reinforced by simultaneously aiding domestic economic growth and regime legitimacy. Militarisation of the region enables Russia to establish a foothold and lay claim to rightholdership. Thus, it is important to consider the intangible ideational impact of the Arctic as an identity-building project and the loss of influence suffered from the collapse of the Soviet Union, which motivates such a project. This also highlights how Russia’s actions in the region are primarily defensive, despite some antagonising acts, pre-empting others who may attempt to establish themselves in Russia’s neighbourhood. Militarisation is certainly not abnormal among the Arctic states, notably Canada. Nonetheless, the fear it provokes undermines much needed foreign cooperation in order to be successful in the region. Foreign support and expertise is needed for territory claims, resource extraction, and growth of the NSR. Whilst Russia’s desire for great power status denotes a degree of competitiveness, this does not deprive it of a desire for cooperation. Despite military provocations and a lack of progress with the U.S., as the Trump administration does not seem to be moving away from classic American-Russian antagonism, Russia has made notable progress with its neighbours. The range of institutions and international laws in place have prevented a violent escalation of inevitable disagreements, which are so prevalent that even closely-aligned Western states often engage in bitter feuds with one another. However, fear of the other could lead to a spiralling security situation out of the blue. Therefore, Russia has an opportunity to achieve its much craved international recognition but it will only achieve this by cooperatively working within the international system to develop the economic, environmental, and security aspects of the region. Otherwise, it risks being defeated and perhaps worse in the Russian psyche, ignored, by an overwhelming combined force of its Western Arctic neighbours and the increasingly vocal non-Arctic states.

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

Ali, I. (2017). ‘U.S. General Says Russia Deploys Cruise Missile. Threatens NATO’. [Online] Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-missiles-idUSKBN16F23V. [Accessed: 13 March 2017].

 

Berkman, P.A. (2010) ‘Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean: Promoting Co-operation and Preventing Conflict’. Abingdon: Routledge Journals.

 

Borgerson, S.G. (2008) ‘Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implication of Global Warming’. Foreign Affairs. 87(2). Pp. 63-77.

 

Boswell, R. (2008) ‘“Astonishing” Data Boost Arctic Claim’. Ottawa Citizen. 12 November. A3.

 

Brubaker, R.D. (2005) ‘The Russian Arctic Straits’. Leiden: Nijhoff.

 

Campbell, C. (2012) ‘China and the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles’. Washington, DC: United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

 

Chakraborty, B. (2017) ‘Trump Facing GOP Pressure to Counter Russia’s Arctic Fleet’. [Online] Available at: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/23/trump-facing-gop-pressure-to-counter-russias-arctic-fleet.html. [Accessed: 13 March 2017].

 

Charon, A. (2005) ‘The Northwest Passage in Context’. Canadian Military Journal. 6(4). Pp. 41-48.

 

Dateline NBC. (2000) ‘War Games’. 12 November.

 

Deudney, D. and Ikenberry, G.J. (2009) ‘The Myth of the Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail’. Foreign Affairs. 88(1). Pp. 77-93.

 

Dlouhy, J.A. and Traywick, C. (2017) ‘Opening Arctic for Drilling is Trump Priority, Key Senator Says’. [Online] Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-10/opening-arctic-for-drilling-is-trump-priority-key-senator-says. [Accessed: 12 March 2017].

 

The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada. (2009) ‘Joint Statement by Canada and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North’. Press Release 11 March 2009. Ottawa.

 

Gahr Støre, J. (2009) ‘Current Strategic Challenges in the High North’. 29 January. Statement at NATO seminar by Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Reykjavik, Iceland.

 

Gramer, R. (2017) ‘Here’s What Russia’s Military build-up in the Arctic Looks Like’. [Online] Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/heres-what-russias-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-looks-like-trump-oil-military-high-north-infographic-map/. [Accessed: 28 January 2017].

 

Gullestrup, P., and Stumbaum, M.B. (2010) ‘Coping with Piracy: The European Piracy: The European Union and the Shipping Industry’. In: van Ginkel, B., and van der Putten, F.-P. (eds.) ‘The International Response to Somali Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities’. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. Pp. 105-126.

 

Guoqiang, T. (2013) ‘Arctic Issue and China’s Policy’. [Online] Available at: http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-03/04/content_5772842.htm. [Accessed: 17 March 2017].

 

Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., and Perraton, J. (1999) ‘Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture’. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

 

Hille, K. (2016) ‘Russia’s Arctic Obsession’. [Online] Available at: https://ig.ft.com/russian-arctic/. [Accessed: 2 February 2017].

 

Ho, J. (2011) ‘The Arctic Meltdown and Its Implications for Ports and Shipping in Asia. In:

 

Kraska, J. (ed.) ‘Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 33-44.

 

Howard, R. (2009) ‘The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources’. London: Continuum.

 

Institute of Strategic Studies. (2009) ‘The Military Balance’. Abingdon: Routledge.

 

Jackson, L. and Peng, J. (2012) ‘China’s Arctic Aspirations’. SIPRI Policy Paper 34. Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Research Institute.

 

James, P. (2012) ‘Canada and Conflict’. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.

 

Jensen, L.C. (2010) ‘Approaching the North: Norwegian and Russian Foreign Policy Discourses on the European Arctic’. Polar Research. 29. Pp. 439-450.

 

Kallio, J. (2017) ‘Foreward: Finland’. In: Koivurova, T., Tianbao, Q., Nykänen, T., and Duyck, S. (eds.) ‘Arctic Law and Governance: The Role of China, Finland and the EU’. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Pp. vii-viii.

 

Kefferpütz, R. (2010) ‘On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North’. CEPS Policy Brief No. 205. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

 

Koivurova, T. (2011) ‘Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance. 2010. 46(2). Polar Record. Pp. 146-156.

 

Kraska, J. (2007) ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage’. International Journal for Marine and Coastal Law. 22(2). Pp. 257-281.

 

Laruelle, M. (2014) ‘Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North’. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

 

Lassere, F., and Pelletier, S. (2011) ‘Polar Super Seaways? Maritime Transport in the Arctic: An Analysis of Shipowners’ Intentions’. Journal of Transport Geography. 19(6). Pp. 1465-1473.

 

Mackrael, K. (2014) ‘Finland Urges Mending of Relations between Russia and the West’. [Online] Available at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/finland-urges-mending-of-relations-between-russia-and-the-west/article21077456/. [Accessed: 29 January 2017].

 

Marshall, T. (2016) ‘Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics’. London: Elliott and Thompson.

 

Morgenthau, H.J. (1973) ‘Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace’. 5th Edition. New York, NY: Knopf.

 

Nykänen, T. (2017) ‘A Common Heritage: The Place of the Arctic in the Chinese and Finnish Discourses’. In: Koivurova, T., Tianbao, Q., Nykänen, T., and Duyck, S. (eds.) ‘Arctic Law and Governance: The Role of China, Finland and the EU’. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Pp. 131-152.

 

Plouffe, J. (2012) ‘Thawing Ice and French Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Assessment’. In: Heininen, L. (ed.) ‘Arctic Yearbook 2012’. Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum. Pp. 52-80.

 

Pravda. (2005) ‘USA to Steal Oil-Rich Region Away from Russia’. 8 December.

 

Ramberg, B. (2010). ‘Climatic Change and Singapore: Scenario by 2050’. Paper presented at the International Conference on Vision and Roadmap for R&D Priorities in Maritime Environment, Technology, Business, Policy and Security. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

 

Rozhnov, K. (2010) ‘Norway and Russia “Open for Business” in the Barents Sea’. [Online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11299024. [Accessed: 27 February 2017].

 

RUSNAVY. (2012) ‘French Frigate De Grasse to Call at Severomorsk’. [Online] Available at: http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=15227. [Accessed: 30 January 2017].

 

Schreck, C. (2017) ‘Ukrainian FM Says Tillerson Pledges U.S. Support Against ‘Russian Aggression’. [Online] Available at: http://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-says-us-tillerson-pledges-support-vs-russia-aggression/28356188.html. [Online: Accessed: 13 March 2017].

 

Schuster, C.O. (1999) ‘Wunderland I and II, Operations: Summer 1942 and 1943’. In: Zabecki, D.T. (ed.) ‘World War Two in Europe: An Encyclopaedia’. Volume II. New York, NY: Garland Publishing. Pp. 1738-1740.

 

Skedsmo, P. (2005) ‘Doing Good in Murmansk? Civil Society, Ideology and Everyday Practices in a Russian Environmental NGO’. FNI-Report 14/2005. Lysaker, Norway: Fridtjof Nansens Institute.

 

Smith, A. (2009) ‘Global Warming Reopens the Northeast Passage’. TIME. 17 September. [Online] Available at: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1924410,00.html. [Accessed: 15 March 2017].

 

STRATFOR. (2015) ‘Russia in the Arctic: A Different Kind of Military Presence’. [Online] Available at: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-arctic-different-kind-military-presence. [Accessed: 29 January 2017].

 

Tianbao, Q., and Miaomiao, L. (2017) ‘Strengthening China’s Role in the Arctic Council’. In: Koivurova, T., Tianbao, Q., Nykänen, T., and Duyck, S. (eds.) ‘Arctic Law and Governance: The Role of China, Finland and the EU’. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Pp. 19-42.

 

US Energy Information Administration. (2014) ‘World Oil Transit Chokepoints’. [Online] Available at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC. [Accessed: 23 February 2017].

 

Wallace, M., and Staples, S. (2010) ‘Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue’. Toronto: Canadian Pugwash Group.

 

Watters, S., and Tonami, A. (2012) ‘Singapore: An Emerging Arctic Actor’. In: Heininen, L. (ed.) ‘Arctic Yearbook 2012’. Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum. Pp. 105-114.

 

Wright, D.C. (2011) ‘The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debate and Discussion in China’. Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute.

 

Yalowitz, K.S., Collins, J.F., and Virginia, R.A. (2009) ‘The Arctic Climate Challenge and Security Policy Conference: Final Report and Findings’. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

 

Yulsman, T. (2017) ‘The Arctic in the Age of Trump’. [Online] Available at: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/imageo/2017/01/23/the-arctic-in-the-age-of-trump/#.WMaKlzZ8GMI. [Accessed: 13 March 2017].

 

Zysk, K. (2010) ‘Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints’. Joint Forces Quarterly. 57(2). Pp. 103-110.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Igor Chernyshenko. Cited in: Hille, K. (2016) ‘Russia’s Arctic Obsession’. [Online] Available at: https://ig.ft.com/russian-arctic/. [Accessed: 2 February 2017]; See also: Security Council of the Russian Federation. Cited in: Jensen, L.C. (2010) ‘Approaching the North: Norwegian and Russian Foreign Policy Discourses on the European Arctic’. Polar Research. 29. Pp. 439-450. P. 446.

[2] Borgerson, S.G. (2008) ‘Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implication of Global Warming’. Foreign Affairs. 87(2). Pp. 63-77; Dr. Guo Peiqing. Cited in: Campbell, C. (2012) ‘China and the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles’. Washington, DC: United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission. P. 24.

[3] Berkman, P.A. (2010) ‘Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean: Promoting Co-operation and Preventing Conflict’. Abingdon: Routledge Journals; Smith, A. (2009) ‘Global Warming Reopens the Northeast Passage’. TIME. 17 September. [Online] Available at: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1924410,00.html. [Accessed: 15 March 2017].

[4] US Energy Information Administration. (2014) ‘World Oil Transit Chokepoints’. [Online] Available at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC. [Accessed: 23 February 2017].

[5] Gullestrup, P., and Stumbaum, M.B. (2010) ‘Coping with Piracy: The European Piracy: The European Union and the Shipping Industry’. In: van Ginkel, B., and van der Putten, F.-P. (eds.) ‘The International Response to Somali Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities’. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. Pp. 105-126.

[6] Ho, J. (2011) ‘The Arctic Meltdown and Its Implications for Ports and Shipping in Asia. In: Kraska, J. (ed.) ‘Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 33-44; Watters, S., and Tonami, A. (2012) ‘Singapore: An Emerging Arctic Actor’. In: Heininen, L. (ed.) ‘Arctic Yearbook 2012’. Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum.

[7] Hille, K. op cit.

[8] Howard, R. (2009) ‘The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources’. London: Continuum. P. 162.

[9] Hille, K. op cit.

[10] Jackson, L., and Peng, J. (2012) ‘China’s Arctic Aspirations’. SIPRI Policy Paper 34. Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Research Institute. P. 7.

[11] Laruelle, M. (2014) ‘Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North’. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

[12] Berkman, P.A. op cit; Campbell, C. op cit; Lassere, F., and Pelletier, S. (2011) ‘Polar Super Seaways? Maritime Transport in the Arctic: An Analysis of Shipowners’ Intentions’. Journal of Transport Geography. 19(6). Pp. 1465-1473.

[13] Howard, R. op cit.

[14] Cited in: Marshall, T. (2016) ‘Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics’. London: Elliott and Thompson.

[15] Berkman, P.A. op cit. P. 4.

[16] Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., and Perraton, J. (1999) ‘Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture’. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

[17] Boswell, R. (2008) ‘“Astonishing” Data Boost Arctic Claim’. Ottawa Citizen. 12 November. A3.

[18] Kefferpütz, R. (2010) ‘On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North’. CEPS Policy Brief No. 205. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. P. 4.

[19] Borgerson, S.G. op cit; Kefferpütz, R. op cit.

[20] Howard. R. op cit. P. 144

[21] Speech by Vladimir Putin. Cited in: Ibid. P. 3; See also: Laruelle, M. op cit. P. 135; Plouffe, J. (2012) ‘Thawing Ice and French Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Assessment’. In: Heininen, L. (ed.) ‘Arctic Yearbook 2012’. Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum. Pp. 52-80; Security Council of the Russian Federation. Cited in: Jensen, L.C. op cit. P. 446; Speech by Vladimir Putin. Cited in Jensen, L.C. op cit. P. 445.

[22] Howard, R. op cit. P. 147.

[23] Kefferpütz, R. op cit. P. 9.

[24] Tianbao, Q., and Miaomiao, L. (2017) ‘Strengthening China’s Role in the Arctic Council’. In: Koivurova, T., Tianbao, Q., Nykänen, T., and Duyck, S. (eds.) ‘Arctic Law and Governance: The Role of China, Finland and the EU’. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Pp. 19-42.

[25] Berkman, P.A. op cit. P. 82; Laruelle, M. op cit.

[26] Laruelle, M. op cit; Marshall, T. op cit.

[27] Dlouhy, J.A. and Traywick, C. (2017) ‘Opening Arctic for Drilling is Trump Priority, Key Senator Says’. [Online] Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-10/opening-arctic-for-drilling-is-trump-priority-key-senator-says. [Accessed: 12 March 2017].

[28] Howard, R. op cit; Jensen, L.C. op cit.

[29] Schreck, C. (2017) ‘Ukrainian FM Says Tillerson Pledges U.S. Support Against ‘Russian Aggression’. [Online] Available at: http://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-says-us-tillerson-pledges-support-vs-russia-aggression/28356188.html. [Online: Accessed: 13 March 2017].

[30] Campbell, C. op cit.

[31] Nykänen, T. (2017) ‘A Common Heritage: The Place of the Arctic in the Chinese and Finnish Discourses’. In: Koivurova, T. et al. op cit. Pp. 131-152.

[32] Mackrael, K. (2014) ‘Finland Urges Mending of Relations between Russia and the West’. [Online] Available at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/finland-urges-mending-of-relations-between-russia-and-the-west/article21077456/. [Accessed: 29 January 2017].

[33] Hille, K. op cit; Speech by Dmitry Medvedev. Cited in: Kefferpütz, R. op cit. P. 2.

[34] Speech by Steven Harper. Cited in: Howard, R. op cit. P. 188.

[35] The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada. (2009) ‘Joint Statement by Canada and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North’. Press Release 11 March 2009. Ottawa; Kefferpütz, R. op cit.

[36] Statement by the Norwegian Government. Cited in: Jensen, L.C. op cit.

[37] Campbell, C. op cit. P. 4; Rozhnov, K. (2010) ‘Norway and Russia “Open for Business” in the Barents Sea’. [Online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11299024. [Accessed: 27 February 2017].

[38] Borgerson, S.G. op cit; Tianbao, Q., and Miaomiao, L. op cit. P. 28;

[39] Berkman, P.A. op cit; Brubaker, R.D. (2005) ‘The Russian Arctic Straits’. Leiden: Nijhoff; Marshall, T. op cit.

[40] Borgerson, S.G. op cit. P. 73.

[41] Jensen, L.C. op cit. P. 447; Laurelle, M. op cit; Marshall, T. op cit.

[42] Berkman, P.A. op cit; Wallace, M., and Staples, S. (2010) ‘Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue’. Toronto: Canadian Pugwash Group; Yalowitz, K.S., Collins, J.F., and Virginia, R.A. (2009) ‘The Arctic Climate Challenge and Security Policy Conference: Final Report and Findings’. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[43] Speech by Vladimir Putin. Cited in Jensen, L.C. op cit. P. 445;

[44] Cited in: Howard, R. op cit. P. 3.

[45] Jensen, L.C. op cit.; Morgenthau, H.J. (1973) ‘Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace’. 5th Edition. New York, NY: Knopf; Skedsmo, P. (2005) ‘Doing Good in Murmansk? Civil Society, Ideology and Everyday Practices in a Russian Environmental NGO’. FNI-Report 14/2005. Lysaker, Norway: Fridtjof Nansens Institute.

[46] Republican Senator, Dan Sullivan. Cited in: Gramer, R. (2017) ‘Here’s What Russia’s Military build-up in the Arctic Looks Like’. [Online] Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/heres-what-russias-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-looks-like-trump-oil-military-high-north-infographic-map/. [Accessed: 28 January 2017]; Republican Senator, Duncan Hunter. Cited in: Chakraborty, B. (2017) ‘Trump Facing GOP Pressure to Counter Russia’s Arctic Fleet’. [Online] Available at: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/23/trump-facing-gop-pressure-to-counter-russias-arctic-fleet.html. [Accessed: 13 March 2017]; US Coast Guard Captain, Melissa Bert. Cited in: Marshall, T. op cit. P. 274.

[47] Nikolai Patrushev. Cited in: Kefferpütz, R. op cit. P. 6.

[48] For environmental consequences see: Kallio, J. (2017) ‘Foreward: Finland’. In: Koivurova, T. et al. op cit. Pp. vii-viii; Petteri Talaas, Secretary General of the World Meteorological Organisation. Cited in: Yulsman, T. (2017) ‘The Arctic in the Age of Trump’. [Online] Available at: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/imageo/2017/01/23/the-arctic-in-the-age-of-trump/#.WMaKlzZ8GMI. [Accessed: 13 March 2017]; Marshall, T. op cit. P. 267; Wright, D.C. (2011) ‘The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debate and Discussion in China’. Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute; For shipping consequences see: Watters, S., and Tonami, A.  ‘Singapore: An Emerging Arctic Actor’. In: Heininen, L. (ed.) op cit. Pp. 105-114; Ramberg, B. (2010). ‘Climatic Change and Singapore: Scenario by 2050’. Paper presented at the International Conference on Vision and Roadmap for R&D Priorities in Maritime Environment, Technology, Business, Policy and Security. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

[49] Guoqiang, T. (2013) ‘Arctic Issue and China’s Policy’. [Online] Available at: http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-03/04/content_5772842.htm. [Accessed: 17 March 2017].

[50] China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, UK.

[51] Koivurova, T. (2011) ‘Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance. 2010. 46(2). Polar Record. Pp. 146-156.

[52] Charon, A. (2005) ‘The Northwest Passage in Context’. Canadian Military Journal. 6(4). Pp. 41-48; Kraska, J. (2007) ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage’. International Journal for Marine and Coastal Law. 22(2). Pp. 257-281.

[53] James, P. (2012) ‘Canada and Conflict’. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. P. 109.

[54] Speech by Steven Harper. Cited in: Ibid. P. 107.

[55] James, P. op cit.

[56] Jensen, L.C. op cit. P. 448.

[57] Berkman, P.A. op cit; Howard, R. op cit. P. 155.

[58] Zysk, K. (2010) ‘Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints’. Joint Forces Quarterly. 57(2). Pp. 103-110.

[59] Gramer, R. op cit.

[60] Ali, I. (2017). ‘U.S. General Says Russia Deploys Cruise Missile. Threatens NATO’. [Online] Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-missiles-idUSKBN16F23V. [Accessed: 13 March 2017].

[61] Marshall, T. op cit.

[62] Howard, R. op cit.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Howard, R. op cit.

[65] Ibid. P. 142.

[66] Dateline NBC. (2000) ‘War Games’. 12 November.

[67] Howard, R. op cit. P. 142; See also: Deudney, D. and Ikenberry, G.J. (2009) ‘The Myth of the Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail’. Foreign Affairs. 88(1). Pp. 77-93. Laruelle, M. op cit.

[68] STRATFOR. (2015) ‘Russia in the Arctic: A Different Kind of Military Presence’. [Online] Available at: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-arctic-different-kind-military-presence. [Accessed: 29 January 2017].

[69] James, P. op cit.

[70] Schuster, C.O. (1999) ‘Wunderland I and II, Operations: Summer 1942 and 1943’. In: Zabecki, D.T. (ed.) ‘World War Two in Europe: An Encyclopaedia’. Volume II. New York, NY: Garland Publishing. Pp. 1738-1740.

[71] Perceived threats and real attacks from the likes of Hitler and Napoleon to the west, Turkic and Arab groups to the south, and the Mongols to the east are important historical considerations. Also note the “North Russia Intervention” of 1918-1920 in which Western states intervened on the side of the White movement.

[72] Pravda. (2005) ‘USA to Steal Oil-Rich Region Away from Russia’. 8 December; Rossiskaya Gazeta. Cited in: Howard, R. op cit. P. 159; Security Council of the Russian Federation. Cited in: Jensen, L.C. op cit. P. 446.

[73] Borgerson, S.G. op cit. P. 64.

[74] Institute of Strategic Studies. (2009) ‘The Military Balance’. Abingdon: Routledge.

[75] RUSNAVY. (2012) ‘French Frigate De Grasse to Call at Severomorsk’. [Online] Available at: http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=15227. [Accessed: 30 January 2017].

[76] Kefferpütz, R. op cit. P. 7.

[77] Gahr Støre, J. (2009) ‘Current Strategic Challenges in the High North’. 29 January. Statement at NATO seminar by Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Reykjavik, Iceland.

[78] Berkman, P.A. op cit. P. 119.