Kyrgyzstan has been unique among Central Asian states in its continual challenges to regime authority. The main factor separating Kyrgyzstan from its Central Asian neighbours appears to be the lack of central control over elites who are then able to mobilise discontented masses who otherwise may have lacked cohesion. Identity cleavages, poor political decisions, external factors, and financial difficulties have inhibited Kyrgyz regimes from keeping elites completely under their control. This has been exacerbated by a highly corrupt weak state that can not provide for the masses nor contain elite-mobilised protests. Amongst other skirmishes, there have been two notable revolutions: the “Tulip Revolution” of 2005 that ousted Askar Akaev, and the 2010 revolution that ousted Kurmanbek Bakiyev. These two revolutions prove the power that a combination of disaffected elites and masses can bring to bear upon a weak regime. The regime, however, has not always been the target of anger with regional and ethnic divisions combining to create violence such as the June 2010 clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek groups. In order to produce long-term stability, Kyrgyzstan needs to widen access to politics and distribute state funds in a way that benefits the population as a whole, rather than private economic interests. President Almazbek Atambayev is constitutionally obliged to step down after the November 2017 presidential election. If he does, it will be the first step toward producing the desired long-term stability.

 

Elites have had power within Kyrgyz society due to clan ties and times of economic uncertainty increasing their value among the mass of the population.[1] Thus, the need to control them is important as Akaev was able to do in the early 1990s as he ‘built up an alliance with regional bosses and was able to consolidate political life’.[2] Yet, elites have proven difficult to fully control, with neither Akaev nor Bakiyev able to completely strip elites of their financial and political power.[3] Elite defection has played an important role in Kyrgyz unrest and revolution.[4] Under Akaev, increasing nepotism, exclusions, personal conflicts, and disputes over resource allocation led to ‘a shift in elite loyalties’.[5] In particular, the narrow sharing of shrinking resources, much of which was greedily consumed by the Akaev family, destabilised elite pacts that went back as far as 1990. [6] More and more elites who had previously supported Akaev, became ‘vulnerable to seduction by disaffected southern elites and northern leaders who had already been sidelined by Akaev’.[7] The alienation of elites such as Bakiyev, who had been prime minister, and Azimbek Beknazarov left powerful figures outside the regime. In a society where kinship is powerful, these figures could mobilise mass support against the regime using local clan and patronage networks, as Beknazarov’s supporters did after his arrest in 2002 leading to violence in the region of Aksy.[8] In addition, Akaev’s announcement that he would not seek re-election in 2005 without outlining a clear strategy for the succession incentivised elites to mobilise against each other in battles for the presidency and parliamentary positions, which could provide immunity from prosecution and access to state resources.[9] Similar elite competition over political power and economic resources, fuelled by uncertainty in the spring, featured prominently during the 2010 revolution. Thus, protests against the regime have been ‘elite, not mass instigated’.[10] Ultimately, an inability to clinically consolidate the regime into a single pyramid ‘allowed the space to challenge an increasingly kleptocratic elite’.[11]

 

It is important not to ignore the mass population as since independence there has often been ‘widespread discontent’[12] and ‘deep levels of social and political anger’[13] over issues of poverty, inequality, nepotism, unjust courts, healthcare, opposition persecution, and pervasive corruption.[14] This is not surprising given that corruption has extended ‘far beyond the scope of the Communist period’[15] whilst ‘more than half the population is living in poverty’.[16] Such a level of corruption, which is one of the highest among post-Soviet states,[17] increases ‘distance between the local level and the state’, thereby forfeiting widespread support.[18] Police brutality was taken to new levels by Bakiyev whilst he also ‘turned once-friendly businessmen against his regime’ by significantly raising taxes for small and medium-sized businesses, which put hundreds on the brink of closure and made it nearly impossible to operate a small business outside of Bishkek.[19] Economic growth, such as that between 1996 and 2000 when incomes rose by 25.3 percent,[20] would go a long way towards disincentivising mobilisation, but only if its benefits were felt across the population. Ultimately, without such widespread grievances, disaffected elites would not be able to mobilise a threatening movement against the regime.

 

Instability has also occurred due to the weak Kyrgyz state, which has lacked the capacity to to bring order to the country. Mass predation came at the expense of promoting state-building and institutional stability that could prevent lawlessness.[21] Yet, all other Central Asian states are plagued by rampant corruption but they typically remain capable of curtailing instability. The key to understanding the difference may be through the diffusion of political power through the elite patronage system, which renders the state unable to ‘assert itself at the local level’.[22] When combined with a proliferation of disaffected elites, there is no ‘infrastructural power’ capable of enforcing the state’s will.[23] Both the Tulip Revolution and the 2010 revolution, and to some extent Aksy, showed how the regimes’ inability to connect down the pyramid led to paralysis as police defections, caused by issues such as a perceived government betrayal, ‘made repression impossible’.[24] The state’s inability to control the criminal underworld led to organised crime increasingly challenging Akaev and providing support for revolutionaries.[25] The violence of June 2010 in which appeals were made to the Central Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) to intervene, also highlighted the interim government’s inability to restore order, particularly given its lack of authority in the south.[26]

 

It has been argued that the colour revolutions of other post-Soviet states were recreated in the Tulip Revolution.[27] However, it is perhaps more accurate to see the value of other colour revolutions in a symbolic light as the Tulip Revolution was clearly not properly controlled nor managed by a united and organised leadership.[28] Contingency played a large role in the spillover of the colour revolutions, as ‘the power of representation’ led to symbols being applied to local factors of elite disaffection and mass grievances already taking place.[29] Thus, the key factor remains the local context although the psychological element of the colour revolutions as example was a useful contributing element. Whilst local contexts are vital, the influence of external countries has also been influential in creating instability, particularly during 2010. Influence has been strictly economic and geopolitical in nature as the internationally supported NGO sector has remained ‘marginalised’ with ‘little structural impact on Kyrgyz politics’.[30] Since the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan has been dependent upon international aid receiving more per capita from USAID than any other former Soviet republic between 1993 and 1996.[31] It is also highly dependent upon Russian investment and remittances from Kyrgyz citizens in Russia.[32] Consequently, any decline in aid or Russian financial difficulty leads to issues in dividing shrinking resources between competing factions. Furthermore, Kyrgyz elites have turned to weakly regulated Western financial institutions in order to facilitate their economic activities as these provide a means to launder stolen illicit funds, thus further undermining state capacity.[33] A bidding war between the U.S. and Russia over the Manas air base further fuelled elite predation, whilst the American victory lead Russia to mobilise ‘its instruments of soft power in a concerted effort to weaken the Kyrgyz ruler’.[34] Moscow highlighted the Bakiyev family’s power ambitions and corruption whilst introducing an export duty on fuel exports to the country that caused price increases and consequent grievances.[35] It seems highly unlikely that either power wanted a regime collapse in 2010 but the episode demonstrated the vulnerability and susceptibility of Kyrgyzstan’s elite predation networks and weak state to external influences.

 

A contributing factor towards instability has been identity issues centring around regionalism and ethnicity. Kyrgyz make up 72 percent of the population whilst Uzbeks make up 14 percent.[36] Regional divides have often prevented mass grievances from forming a coherent group to challenge the regime, however on occasion, cross-regional alliances built upon increasing elite disaffection have worked to bring down the regime but their unity often breaks down once the common goal has been achieved.[37] Socio-economic difficulties and attempts to keep other regional groups out of power have caused tensions and instability such as in Aksy and in June 2010 when ethnic tensions and a ‘lack of central authority in the south’ led to nearly 500 deaths ‘at a level of ferocity not seen since late-Soviet times’ when inter-communal conflict occurred in Osh in 1990.[38] Uzbeks have long felt insecure, ignored, and under attack with barely any featuring in key political posts due to active discrimination form Kyrgyz leaders who sought to privilege their own group.[39] However, it is useful to note how and why violence did not occur in 2010. One group of scholars notes the local nature of peacekeeping in the city of Aravan in which ‘interactions between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz have taken place on multiple levels’ leading to ‘key actors with intergroup familiarity and intragroup authority’.[40] Whilst acknowledging the case of contingency, such cases of inter-group cohesion provide tentative potential for Kyrgyzstan to avoid instability if such dynamics can be replicated across the country.

Kyrgyzstan has remained ‘an exception in Central Asia’ as a country where the ruling elite’s power is somewhat limited by the opposition.[41]  With a vast number of registered political parties there is potential for genuine opposition to develop and constrain leaders,[42] but regime change has not led to a fundamental change in governance with ‘old patterns reproducing themselves and hindering efforts at real reform’.[43] The lack of will and ability to tackle recurring problems such as corruption simply leads to a repeat of mass and elite grievances acting as a focal point for mobilisation against the regime. The Tulip Revolution left in place the fraudulently-elected parliament and replaced one group of elites with another in what was simply ‘a transfer of power’[44], not a governance overhaul.[45] Opposition was led by previous regime elites like Bakiyev and former Vice-President Felix Kulov, who in actual fact implemented ‘many of the centralising and more authoritarian reforms that Akaev himself had sought to introduce in 2003-2005’.[46] The opposition managed to attain new constitutions in 2006 but, under Bakiyev, the state actually witnessed what has been described as ‘the dark years’ of corruption and intimidation in which the state was criminalised to an even greater degree.[47] The post-2010 system theoretically reduced the powers of the president although this does not appear to have restrained President Atambayev too much as he has continued to hound opponents through the security services, and the arrest of a main contender for the 2017 presidential elections, Omurbek Tekebayev, highlights how ‘old patterns are repeating themselves again, as Kyrgyzstan’s Groundhog Day comes around once more’.[48]

 

In conclusion, Kyrgyzstan’s mass predation, increasingly fuelled by external influences, leads to weak state institutions whose shortcomings create grievances among the mass population. An inability to consolidate elites into a single controllable pyramid, in part influenced by identity cleavages, poor political decisions, and financial difficulties, offers freedom for disaffected voices to mobilise masses into violence and revolution. The weak state then struggles to maintain order. Instability is exacerbated by regional and ethnic tensions. Ultimately, when revolutions have occurred, substantive and fundamental reform is lacking, thereby leading to the same problems inevitably resurfacing once again almost cyclical in nature. Many of these structural issues can be identified in other Central Asian states but the particular freedom of manoeuvre and possibility for disaffection among Kyrgyz elites creates a group that can galvanise meaningful collective action through clans, kinship, and temporary alliances. Thus, the regime’s inability to consolidate its power creates potential for it to be challenged. As regimes have struggled to replicate Turkmenistan-like repression or Tajikistan-like soft authoritarianism in which financial and political power is more widely shared, a new system is required. A political system that strengthened state institutions to provide both stability and wider access to politics, one that stamped down on predation, and one that addressed the population’s grievances would eradicate much of the power of those seeking to ferment unrest. The current regime’s continuation of old habits suggests that this is unlikely but if President Atambayev steps down in November 2017, as he is constitutionally obliged, the first steps toward long-term stability will have been taken.

Bibliography

 

Adamson, F.B. (2002) ‘International Democracy Assistance in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Building Civil Society from the Outside?’. In Mendelson, S.E., and Glenn, J.K. (eds.) ‘The Power and Limits of NGOs’. New York: Columbia University Press. P. 177- 206.

 

Anderson., J. (1999) ‘Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of Democracy?’. Abingdon: Routledge.

 

Beissinger, M.R. (2007) ‘Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions’. Perspectives on Politics. 5(2). Pp. 259-276.

 

Collins, K. (2009) ‘Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia: Its Impact in Regime Transformation’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Cooley, A. (2012) ‘Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Cooley, A., and Heathershaw, J. (2017) ‘Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia’. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

 

Cummings, S.N., and Ryabkov, M. (2008) ‘Situating the “Tulip Revolution”’. Central Asian Survey. 27(3-4). Pp. 241-252.

 

Doolot, A., and Heathershaw, J. (2015) ‘State as Resource, Mediator and Performer: Understanding the Local and Global Politics of Gold Mining in Kyrgyzstan’. Central Asian Survey. 34(1). Pp. 93-109.

 

Engvall, J. (2007) ‘Kyrgyzstan: The Autonomy of a State’. Problems of Post-Communism. 54(4). Pp. 33-45.

 

Fairbanks, C.H. (2007) ‘Revolution Reconsidered’. Journal of Democracy. 18(1). Pp. 42-57.

 

Hale, H.E. (2006) ‘Democracy or Autocracy on the March? The Colored Revolutions as Normal Dynamics of Patronal Presidentialism’. Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 39(3). Pp. 305-329.

 

Heathershaw, J. (2007) ‘The Tulip Fades: “Revolution” and Repercussions in Kyrgyzstan’. [Online] Available at: http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol17/heathershaw.html. [Accessed: 8 March 2017].

 

Heathershaw, J. (2009) ‘Rethinking the International Diffusion of Coloured Revolutions: The Power of Representation in Kyrgyzstan’. Journal of Communist Studies. 25(2-3). Pp. 297-323.

 

Heathershaw, J. (2010) ‘Beware of Meddling in Kyrgyzstan!’. [Online] Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/john-heathershaw/beware-of-meddling-in-kyrgyzstan. [Accessed: 5 March 2017].

 

International Crisis Group. (2004). ‘Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects’. Asia Report Number 81. Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

 

International Crisis Group. (2010) ‘The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan’. [Online] Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/pogroms-kyrgyzstan. [Accessed: 10 March 2017].

 

Khamidov, A. (2002) ‘Kyrgyzstan’s Unrest Linked to Clan Rivalries’. [Online] Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav060502.shtml. [Accessed: 7 March 2017].

 

Khamidov, A., Megoran, N., and Heathershaw, J. (2017) ‘Bottom-up Peacekeeping in Southern Kyrgyzstan: How Local Actors Managed to Prevent the Spread of Violence from Osh/Jalal-Abad to Aravan, June 2010’. Nationalities Papers. Upcoming 2017.

 

Kimmage, D. (2005) ‘Kyrgyzstan: The Failure of Managed Democracy’. [Online] Available at: http://www.rferl.org/a/1058399.html. [Accessed: 28 February 2017].

 

Kislov, D. (2017) ‘In Kyrgyzstan, it’s Revolution, Revanche, Repeat All Over Again’. [Online] Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/daniil-kislov/in-kyrgyzstan-it-s-revolution-revanche-repeat-all-over-again. [Accessed: 12 March 2017].

 

Kupatadze, A. (2008) ‘Organised Crime Before and After the Tulip Revolution: The Changing Dynamics of Upperworld-Underworld Networks’. Central Asian Survey. 27(3-4). Pp. 279-299.

 

Lewis, D. (2008) ‘The Dynamics of Regime Change: Domestic and International Factors in the ‘“Tulip Revolution”’. Central Asian Survey. 27(3-4). Pp. 265-277.

 

Luckins, M. (2003) ‘Independent Kyrgyzstan: Liberalisation and Economic Reform’. In: Cummings, S.N. (ed.) ‘Oil, Transition, and Security in Central Asia’. Abingdon: Routledge. Pp. 36-46.

 

Marat, E. (2015) ‘Global Money Laundering and Its Domestic Political Consequences in Kyrgyzstan’. Central Asian Survey. 34(1). Pp. 46-56.

 

Melvin, N. (2011) ‘Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes and Legacies of Violence’. [Online] Available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/promoting-stable-and-multiethnic-kyrgyzstan-overcoming-causes-and-legacies-violence. [Accessed: 9 March 2017].

 

National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. (2014) ‘Ethnic Composition of the Population in Kyrgyzstan 1999-2014’. In Russian. [Online] Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140706220049/http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/din.files/census/5010003.pdf. [Accessed: 18 March 2017].

 

Radnitz, S. (2006) ‘What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?’. Journal of Democracy. 17(2). Pp. 132-146.

 

Rahmetov, A. (2009) ‘Kyrgyzstan’s New Tax Code: A Mixed Blessing?’. [Online] Available at: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/11801-field-reports-caci-analyst-2009-3-11-art-11801.html. [Accessed 3 March 2017].

 

Weinthal, E. (2003) ‘Beyond the State: Transnational Actors, NGOs, and Environmental Protection in Central Asia’. In Jones, P. (ed.) ‘The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence’. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. 246-270.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Anderson., J. (1999) ‘Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of Democracy?’. Abingdon: Routledge.

[2] Ibid. P. 41

[3] Marat, E. (2015) ‘Global Money Laundering and Its Domestic Political Consequences in Kyrgyzstan’. Central Asian Survey. 34(1). Pp. 46-56. P. 48.

[4] Beissinger, M.R. (2007) ‘Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions’. Perspectives on Politics. 5(2). Pp. 259-276; Lewis, D. (2008) ‘The Dynamics of Regime Change: Domestic and International Factors in the ‘“Tulip Revolution”’. Central Asian Survey. 27(3-4). Pp. 265-277.

[5] Lewis, D. op cit. P. 267; See also: International Crisis Group. (2004). ‘Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects’. Asia Report Number 81. Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

[6] Collins, K. (2009) ‘Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia: Its Impact in Regime Transformation’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Cooley, A., and Heathershaw, J. (2017) ‘Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia’. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

[7] Lewis, D. op cit. P. 274.

[8] Anderson, J. op cit; Cummings, S.N., and Ryabkov, M. (2008) ‘Situating the “Tulip Revolution”’. Central Asian Survey. 27(3-4). Pp. 241-252; Radnitz, S. (2006) ‘What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?’. Journal of Democracy. 17(2). Pp. 132-146.

[9] Lewis, D. op cit; Marat, E. op cit.

[10] Cummings, S.N., and Ryabkov, M. op cit. P. 244; See also: Lewis, D. op cit; Cooley, A., and Heathershaw, J. op cit.

[11] Cooley, A., and Heathershaw, J. op cit. P. 139.

[12] Luckins, M. (2003) ‘Independent Kyrgyzstan: Liberalisation and Economic Reform’. In: Cummings, S.N. (ed.) ‘Oil, Transition, and Security in Central Asia’. Abingdon: Routledge. Pp. 36-46. P. 38.

[13] Lewis, D. op cit. P. 267.

[14] Collins, K. op cit; Heathershaw, J. (2007) ‘The Tulip Fades: “Revolution” and Repercussions in Kyrgyzstan’. [Online] Available at: http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol17/heathershaw.html. [Accessed: 8 March 2017]; Kimmage, D. (2005) ‘Kyrgyzstan: The Failure of Managed Democracy’. [Online] Available at: http://www.rferl.org/a/1058399.html. [Accessed: 28 February 2017]; Kupatadze, A. (2008) ‘Organised Crime Before and After the Tulip Revolution: The Changing Dynamics of Upperworld-Underworld Networks’. Central Asian Survey. 27(3-4). Pp. 279-299; Lewis, D. op cit; Luckins, M. op cit; Marat, E. op cit.

[15] Anderson, J. op cit. P. 61.

[16] Luckins, M. op cit. P. 39

[17] Kupatadze, A. op cit.

[18] Collins, K. op cit. P. 249.

[19] Marat, E. op cit. P. 53; See also: Rahmetov, A. (2009) ‘Kyrgyzstan’s New Tax Code: A Mixed Blessing?’. [Online] Available at: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/11801-field-reports-caci-analyst-2009-3-11-art-11801.html. [Accessed 3 March 2017].

[20] Luckins, M. op cit. P. 39.

[21] Cooley, A. op cit; Hale, H.E. (2006) ‘Democracy or Autocracy on the March? The Colored Revolutions as Normal Dynamics of Patronal Presidentialism’. Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 39(3). Pp. 305-329; International Crisis Group. (2010) ‘The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan’. [Online] Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/pogroms-kyrgyzstan. [Accessed: 10 March 2017]; Kupatadze, A. op cit; Melvin, N. (2011) ‘Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes and Legacies of Violence’. [Online] Available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/promoting-stable-and-multiethnic-kyrgyzstan-overcoming-causes-and-legacies-violence. [Accessed: 9 March 2017].

[22] Doolot, A., and Heathershaw, J. (2015) ‘State as Resource, Mediator and Performer: Understanding the Local and Global Politics of Gold Mining in Kyrgyzstan’. Central Asian Survey. 34(1). Pp. 93-109. P. 104.

[23] Cummings, S.N., and Ryabkov, M. op cit. P. 244.

[24] Beissinger, M. op cit. P. 269; See also: Engvall, J. (2007) ‘Kyrgyzstan: The Autonomy of a State’. Problems of Post-Communism. 54(4). Pp. 33-45; Lewis, D. op cit; For 2010 see: Cooley, A. op cit.

[25] Kupatadze, A. op cit.

[26] Cooley, A. op cit; Doolot, A., and Heathershaw, J. op cit.

[27] Beissinger, M. op cit.

[28] Cooley, A., and Heathershaw, J. op cit; Heathershaw, J. (2009) ‘Rethinking the International Diffusion of Coloured Revolutions: The Power of Representation in Kyrgyzstan’. Journal of Communist Studies. 25(2-3). Pp. 297-323.

[29] Heathershaw, J. (2009) op cit. P. 297.

[30] Heathershaw, J. (2007) op cit; See also: Adamson, F.B. (2002) ‘International Democracy Assistance in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Building Civil Society from the Outside?’. In Mendelson, S.E., and Glenn, J.K. (eds.) ‘The Power and Limits of NGOs’. New York: Columbia University Press. P. 177- 206; Lewis, D. op cit.

[31] Collins, K. op cit; Cooley, A., and Heathershaw, J. op cit; Doolot, A., and Heathershaw, J. op cit.

[32] Cooley, A. op cit.

[33] Cooley, A., and Heathershaw, J. op cit; Marat, E. op cit; Weinthal, E. (2003) ‘Beyond the State: Transnational Actors, NGOs, and Environmental Protection in Central Asia’. In Jones, P. (ed.) ‘The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence’. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. 246-270.

[34] Cooley, A. op cit. P. 128.

[35] Ibid.

[36] National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. (2014) ‘Ethnic Composition of the Population in Kyrgyzstan 1999-2014’. In Russian. [Online] Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140706220049/http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/din.files/census/5010003.pdf. [Accessed: 18 March 2017].

[37] Cummings, S.N., and Ryabkov, M. op cit; Lewis, D. op cit.

[38] Cooley, A. (2012) ‘Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia’. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 131; See also: Anderson, J. op cit; Collins, K. op cit; Cummings, S.N., and Ryabkov, M. op cit; Khamidov, A. (2002) ‘Kyrgyzstan’s Unrest Linked to Clan Rivalries’. [Online] Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav060502.shtml. [Accessed: 7 March 2017].

[39] Anderson, J. op cit; Collins, K. op cit; Heathershaw, J. (2010) ‘Beware of Meddling in Kyrgyzstan!’. [Online] Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/john-heathershaw/beware-of-meddling-in-kyrgyzstan. [Accessed: 5 March 2017].

[40] Khamidov, A., Megoran, N., and Heathershaw, J. (2017) ‘Bottom-up Peacekeeping in Southern Kyrgyzstan: How Local Actors Managed to Prevent the Spread of Violence from Osh/Jalal-Abad to Aravan, June 2010’. Nationalities Papers. Upcoming 2017. P. 14.

[41] Heathershaw, J. (2007) op cit.

[42] Heathershaw, J. (2010) op cit.

[43] Radnitz, S. op cit. P. 132-133.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Fairbanks, C.H. (2007) ‘Revolution Reconsidered’. Journal of Democracy. 18(1). Pp. 42-57. P. 55; See also: Lewis, D. op cit; Kupatadze, A. op cit.

[46] Lewis, D. op cit. P. 265.

[47] Cooley, A., and Heathershaw, J. op cit. P. 136; See also: Kupatadze, A. op cit.

[48] Kislov, D. (2017) ‘In Kyrgyzstan, it’s Revolution, Revanche, Repeat All Over Again’. [Online] Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/daniil-kislov/in-kyrgyzstan-it-s-revolution-revanche-repeat-all-over-again. [Accessed: 12 March 2017].