Abstract

 

This paper considers the intentions of Benito Mussolini’s foreign policy as the leader of Italy. It investigates a wide array of sources in English, French, German, and Italian that are pertinent to Italian Fascism’s foreign policy. The paper examines: elements of Fascist ideology, particular personality traits of Mussolini, the internal influence of Italy, Mussolini’s behaviour within the international system, key international events, and Fascist Italy’s international relations. The paper interrogates the claim that Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were linked in a common destiny and thus ultimately destined for the disastrous war that ended both regimes. It finds that this claim is based upon a poor conceptualisation of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, which problematically conflates the two systems. In fact, Fascist Italy had key areas of incompatibility with Nazi Germany, whilst it had key areas of compatibility with France, and particularly Britain. In many parts of the Anglophone world, Fascism was revered, whilst in much of Fascist Italy, National Socialism was despised. The paper thus comes to the conclusion that Mussolini’s foreign policy was closer aligned with Britain and France than with Nazi Germany. Therefore, Mussolini’s primary intention was to work closely with Britain and France in order to bring Italy to the status of a Great Power. However, circumstances, triggered by the 1935 Abyssinian War, led to a deterioration of Italy’s relations with the democracies that ultimately pushed Mussolini towards an alliance with Hitler. This was an alliance that Mussolini was not particularly keen for but it was deemed a better alternative than neutrality.

 

Introduction

 

This paper intends to evaluate the intentions of Benito Mussolini’s foreign policy in regard to intended outcomes and desired international partners. It is an historical analysis that will focus on reviewing the vast literature on the topic in order to understand if Mussolini’s foreign policy intentions were different to the outcomes. Inherently, the paper will thus examine what drove Mussolini towards his fateful alliance with Adolf Hitler.

 

Mussolini ultimately sided with Nazi Germany in World War Two. However, his initial intention had always been for a relationship with the Western powers, namely Britain. The parallels that some scholars draw between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany are weak and too simplistic. These parallels largely come from the wartime alliance, which blurred the often pronounced differences between the two systems. There were similarities relating to totalitarianism and dictatorship but there were also huge differences such as how race was perceived and how the two intended to behave within the international system. Mussolini was driven by a nationalistic desire to turn Italy into a Great Power like Britain and France, whilst Hitler wanted to destroy the older powers and create a German “Reich” based upon racial superiority. Thus, Mussolini was more inclined to work within the system, whereas Hitler intended to bring chaos to the prevailing order. Indeed, Mussolini worked closely with Britain and France, although not always with total commitment, until 1935 when the Abyssinian War brought acrimony to the relationships, after British and French refusal to provide de jure recognition of Mussolini’s conquest. This started a chain of events that ultimately pushed Mussolini towards the 1939 “Pact of Steel” alliance with Hitler, whom Mussolini conceived as his second best option, as he believed that neutrality would render Italy defunct as a Great Power. Therefore, in contradiction to wisdom that erroneously conflates Hitler and Mussolini, this paper argues that the two were very different with the relationship never Mussolini’s primary choice. In actual fact, Mussolini, along with the Italian people, intended for a relationship with Britain and France that would contain an increasingly powerful Germany and help achieve Great Power Status for Italy.

 

After providing a general overview of the literature that notes two clear contrasting arguments, the paper is split into four chapters that analyse key areas of relevance relating to Mussolini’s foreign policy. The first chapter begins by examining foundational and external influences upon Mussolini. Firstly, it locates Mussolini’s motives within the ideological context of Fascism. Some claim that Fascism lacked an ideology as it simply advocated pragmatism and blind opportunism. However, a clear coherent core can be identified that influenced the thought of Mussolini. This core centres around nationalism, elitism, anti-rationalism, and the preference for action over transcendence. The chapter then analyses the importance of Mussolini’s personality to his foreign policy and the way in which this was conditioned by Fascist ideology. Key personality facets were: his ego and desire for prestige, his emotional reactions to situations, his preference for action and pragmatism that prompted oscillation, and his charm and foresight that enabled him to sometimes conduct diplomacy astutely and in a friendly manner. Thirdly, the chapter discusses the internal domestic influence upon Mussolini, who is shown to have total control over foreign policy due to his domestic political power. However, his power abroad was constrained by Italy’s fundamental economic problems that rendered it in a compromised position compared to Britain, France, and Germany. The Italian people are shown to have been a major influence upon Mussolini for most of the Fascist period but ultimately became redundant as the cult of Duce ensumed Mussolini. A similar pattern is evident with Mussolini’s mistress, Margherita Sarfatti, who steered Mussolini towards Britain and France until her fall from grace in 1935.

 

The second chapter discusses Mussolini’s conflicting tendencies of competition and cooperation. Here, it is shown that Mussolini intended to achieve his revisionist goals by largely working within the system, in contrast to Hitler, as he had a solid working relationship with the democracies, particularly Britain. The third chapter analyses the pivotal moment of the 1935-36 Abyssinian War and its aftermath, which initiated the process through which Italy began to move towards Germany. It is argued that Mussolini’s desires to bring prestige to Italy through the creation of an Italian empire in Abyssinia were a result of astute and friendly diplomacy with Britain and France that gave every reason to assume that an invasion would be tolerated. However, the conflict ultimately led to Britain and France refusing to provide de jure recognition of the conquest, namely due to the disdain which British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, felt for Mussolini. The refusal to grant de jure caused major irritation for the prestige-driven Mussolini, who began to work towards an alliance with Germany.

 

The final chapter analyses Italy’s compatibilities and incompatibilities with Germany and the West. With regards to Germany, supposed similarities and sympathies are shown to be not as strong as some scholars claim. Attention is thus drawn to the issues that divided Italy and Germany. These issues included the German anti-Semitism, which was continually critiqued in Italy, even after the passing of the 1938 Manifesto on Race that was implemented to attempt to reduce the ideological divide between the two countries. A second issue was “Anschluss”, the German occupation of Austria, which showcased Mussolini’s concern about Hitler, whom he utterly detested as a person and as a political leader. Thus, it is argued that Mussolini’s primary intention was not an alliance with Germany but his even greater desire to avoid neutrality forced the alliance upon him. Mussolini’s relationships with Britain and France are then discussed with the conclusion being that Mussolini ideally intended for strong relations with the democratic powers. His relationship with the French was highly changeable and often antagonistic but the two countries had a fundamental ability to work together. This was particularly the case when France was under the leadership of Aristide Briand and Pierre Laval, in contrast to that of Édouard Déladier. Mussolini’s relationship with Britain was steadier and more consistently positive, particularly in the 1920s. There were elements in Britain that were highly critical of Mussolini but also significant elements, especially within the Conservative Party, that appreciated him greatly. Anthony Eden was not among this group, and his desire not to grant de jure recognition of Mussolini’s Abyssinian conquest was the key moment that scuppered Anglo-Italian relations. To conclude, the paper offers a final review of these issues and highlights the significance of the findings.

 

 

 

Literature Review

 

Given that it is more than ninety years since the Fascists came to power in Italy, there is a vast literature on Mussolini’s foreign policy. Within this body of literature, two clear strands of thought can be identified. The two arguments agree that Italian intervention in Abyssinia marked the key moment in Mussolini’s foreign policy but they disagree as to the motives and intentions surrounding the build-up and aftermath of the event. The first line of thought argues that Mussolini, whilst not strictly adhering to the norms of international diplomacy, largely preferred to work cooperatively with Britain and France. From this point of view, it is deemed that Mussolini’s alliance with Germany was far from natural and certainly not the initial intention. The second line of thought argues that Mussolini was aggressively expansionist, with Italy and Germany being natural allies who worked together to destroy the prevailing system.

 

Mussolini as inclined towards the democracies

 

The pro-democracies body of thought is particularly pushed by Richard Lamb who argues that whilst Mussolini had many personality defects, he was often an astute politician with insightful vision.[1] The literature describes Fascism’s ideological core as pertaining to ultranationalism, regeneration, violence, egoism, elitism, anti-rationalism, and statism.[2] The pro-democracies strand of thought argues that this ideological core influenced Mussolini’s aims and personality, particularly his often impulsive reactions to events, but that it did not render Italy and the democracies incompatible. Indeed, it argues that depictions of good versus evil relating to World War Two have distorted the fact that Britain and France had strong links to Fascism. To this effect, Paul Hollander provides a persuasive account of the deification of Mussolini and Fascism within Britain and the United States.[3] Lamb builds upon the work of Renzo De Felice and Luigi Villari, by utilising a plethora of governmental documents from the British and Italian archives that were released in the mid-1990s.[4] These documents provide strong support to the view that Mussolini preferred a relationship with Britain over one with Hitler, whom he intensely disliked. Lamb therefore concludes that whilst Mussolini had various negative personality flaws and expansionist and revisionist desires, he had no intention for a European war and certainly had no intention to see Hitler become so powerful.

 

This line of thought notes that until the 1935 Abyssinian War, Mussolini had largely aligned his foreign policy with that of Britain, enjoying a strong rapport with many British Conservatives, particularly Austen Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary from 1925 to 1929, and Winston Churchill, Chancellor from 1924 to 1929, although he made many enemies within the British Labour Party. The domestic influence from within Italy is also noted, with Mussolini shown to have complete control over the making of foreign policy, although limited by the comparatively weak Italian economy, which prevented ambitious unilateralism.[5] Another domestic influence was his mistress, Margherita Sarfatti, whose pro-British, pro-French, and anti-German stance guided Mussolini to forge links with the democracies throughout the early part of his regime. Mussolini was keen to maintain his strong friendship with Britain, which he did for many years, whereas he feared and disliked Hitler. Whilst Mussolini’s desires for expansionism were undoubtedly behind the Abyssinian conflict, Lamb argues that prior agreements with Britain and France had clearly given the impression that an Italian invasion would be tolerated. Thus, the fall out from the Abyssinian conflict was as much a series of unfortunate events and poor foreign policy choices by Britain and France as it was Mussolini’s aggression. Lamb believes that after Abyssinia the importance of Mussolini’s personality came to the fore as he obsessed over gaining the prestige of de jure recognition from Britain for his conquest. Lamb, along with many writers such as Mario Toscano and Antonio Varsori, as well as Anthony Beevor, John Coverdale, and the notable journalist of the 1930s, Sisley Huddleston, cite the crucial influence of British foreign secretary Anthony Eden.[6] They argue that Eden trusted Hitler far more than Mussolini and was reluctant to provide de jure, which ultimately forced Mussolini towards Germany and led to a rapid deterioration of Anglo-Italian relations. Without this, Lamb argues, ‘Mussolini would surely have stayed out of Hitler’s arms’.[7]

Mussolini is shown to often be an astute statesman, whilst it was others who lacked foresight, particularly with regards to the German question. Lamb believes that Mussolini ‘both feared and disliked Hitler’, and that his desired solution after Abyssinia was a renewed friendship with Britain.[8] Lamb points to Mussolini’s disgust at Nazi Germany’s anti-Semitism, which went against Fascism’s idea of unity of the nation. Many others, notably A. James Gregor and Meir Michaelis, agree with Lamb on this point, arguing that National Socialism’s anti-Semitism and biological racism provided irreconcilable contradictions when pseudo-Nazification was implemented in 1938. For them, Italian Fascism’s racism is more accurately described as ultranationalism.[9] Lamb also highlights the importance for Mussolini of preventing Anschluss. Again, this is a view supported in the literature with the likes of George Baer, Jasper Ridley, and Patricia Knight all arguing that Mussolini feared the threat that a powerful Germany would pose.[10] Gilbert Allardyce provides a particularly useful critique of the conflation of the German and Italian systems, arguing that the alliance was an unintended circumstance that blurred significant rivalries.[11] Indeed, even as late as the spring of 1940, Lamb shows that Mussolini was very much open to improved relations with Britain and France, as the German-Soviet “Molotov-Ribbentrop” agreement, and the seemingly unstoppable German military machine, highlighted to him the uncontrollability and potential threat of Hitler. It was not until the total defeat of the democracies that Mussolini fully backed Hitler, which the literature unanimously agrees was motivated by greed and a desire to garner as much territory and prestige as possible.

 

Mussolini as inclined towards Germany

 

The second line of thought argues that Italy and Germany were natural allies who both wanted to turn Europe upside down. Such an argument is notably put forward by MacGregor Knox, Peter Neville, and Phillip Morgan.[12] In his analysis, Morgan argues that Mussolini had fundamental and irreconcilable differences with the ‘plutocracies’ of Britain and France.[13] For him, it was never intended, nor was it possible, for there to be relations with Britain and France. As a result of this, Morgan believes the argument that Mussolini had not made up his mind as to who to back by spring 1940 is flawed. An independently strong Italy, made possible through autarky, would help achieve Mussolini’s goal of Mediterranean domination, which would in turn help achieve his ultimate goal to ‘shift the reality of Anglo-French domination of European affairs’.[14] The two democracies were therefore viewed as barriers to Italian growth with conflict being ‘inevitable’.[15] Mussolini’s initial positive relations with Britain and France are explained as a means to keep a low profile before the nationalistic, revisionist, and imperialist foreign policy inevitably came to the fore. This leads Morgan to believe that Mussolini ‘had little time for the principles of parity and respect between countries’.[16]

 

This line of thinking also places emphasis upon Fascist ideology and its apparently aggressive nature. Within the Fascist notion of regeneration was the desire to create the new “Italian man”. The line of thinking pursued by Knox, Neville and Morgan emphasises this regenerative concept for it apparently shows how Italy was psychologically different to the ‘plutocratic and bourgeois powers’ of Britain and France.[17] For Ian Kershaw, it holds a likeness to the German racial concept of the “Aryan”, which contributes towards him believing that the similarities between Germany and Italy were ‘profound’.[18] Mussolini’s domestic and foreign policies were thus viewed as mutually reinforcing and designed to formulate a skilled Italian warrior that would lay the foundations for expansion and the rise of Italy. As a result, the nation was rendered ‘in a perpetual state of mobilisation for war’ that led to several military engagements.[19]

 

Morgan places significant emphasis upon Mussolini’s personality, seeing it as a key driver of foreign policy. He notes Mussolini’s ‘exhibitionist, bullying, and bellicose style’ that lead to ‘mischief-making’ and a ‘conduct of foreign policy, which barely respected the norms of diplomatic activity’.[20] Similarly, Neville views Mussolini’s opportunism sinisterly, as an attempt to exploit and use blackmail, rather than viewing his actions as those of a standard statesman attempting to maximise his country’s position. Knox believes that because of such personality traits, Mussolini and Hitler had a common destiny. For Knox, Mussolini’s aggressive personality contributed to an expansionist and revisionist foreign policy in which he was bound for an ‘inevitable’ conflict with Britain and France.[21] Both Morgan and Knox argue that the prospect of an Italian-German alliance was exciting for Mussolini because he felt that he could exploit it to destabilise the balance of power in Europe. Crisis points such as the Anschluss and competition in the Balkans are viewed as insignificant blips of an otherwise worry-free relationship in which Mussolini at no point contemplated reversing his decision.

 

 

 

Chapter One: Influences upon Foreign Policy

 

Fascist ideology gave direction to Mussolini’s foreign policy as well as conditioning how it was enacted. In turn, it also influenced Mussolini’s contradicting personality, which was ego-driven, erratic, and tempestuous, whilst also capable of being calm and displaying statesmanlike nous. Such traits led to sometimes erratic reactions, but also prophetic vision of situations. Mussolini was able to assert total control over the making of foreign policy but the relative weakness of the Italian economy prevented a unilateral approach to international affairs. Further internal influences were the Italian people, whom he was attentive to at least for the first thirteen years, and his mistress Margherita Sarfatti, who steered him towards Britain and France.

 

Ideology

 

Background

 

An understanding of Fascism as an ideology helps to better understand Mussolini’s fundamental philosophical approach to life that conditioned his foreign policy aims and methods. The fin de siècle period saw a change of cultural attitudes among sectors of the European elite who became ever-more opposed to ‘bourgeois culture, liberalism, humanitarianism, and pacifism’.[22] This was especially pronounced in Italy where a zeitgeist of neoromanticism took hold, epitomised by the works of Richard Wagner, Gabriele D’Annunzio, Giovanni Papini, and Friedrich Nietzsche. The concepts that were developed during this period would come to significantly influence Mussolini.

 

Nationalism

 

In 1913, neoromantic nationalism was far from Mussolini’s mind. At the time, he was devoted to socialist theory and wrote various articles that would amass to fill seven volumes of his collected works.[23] Indeed, his first newspaper had been La Lotta di Classe (The Class Struggle) in which he originally called for neutrality stating, ‘the national flag is for us a rag to be planted on the dung hill. There are only two nations in the world: that of the exploited and that of the exploiters’.[24] However, World War One became a critical moment in Mussolini’s development as he began to realise the influence of national sentiment and pride, which revealed how the proletariat and disaffected did in fact identify with the nation and thus were closely tied to the bourgeoisie.[25] During the war, his commitment to nationalism became complete and he founded the paper Il Popolo d’Italia (The People of Italy). For Mussolini, as a Fascist, the nation fulfilled ‘the same functions fulfilled by class for Mussolini as a socialist’.[26] The nation was the privileged object of loyalty, an irrepressible historical and moral fact that could not be denied.[27] The all-embracing Fascist nationalism would build upon the beginnings of national solidarity that had emerged during the war by taking it to a totalitarian level through the state. The glories of Imperial Rome were to be repeated, whilst embarrassing aspects such as the defeat in the 1896 Battle of Adowa were to be avenged. This nationalist rebirth would produce the “new man”, a hero motivated by duty and honour, who is prepared to dedicate his life to the nation.[28] Thus, based upon the Futurist concepts of Filippo Marinetti, Fascist nationalism was forward-looking seeing itself as a ‘creative force’ that was modelling a new civilisation, which would replace the backwardness that plagued Italy.[29]

 

Elitism

 

Fascism’s rejection of the contemporary liberal order pushed it towards deeply elitist concepts. The Italian school of elitist theory, led and influenced by Ludwig Gumplowicz, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Antonio Gramsci, and Robert Michels, affirmed the necessary dominance of elites who were born with radically different abilities and attributes to the masses.[30] These thinkers significantly influenced Mussolini, who referred to Pareto’s theory of elites as the ‘most ingenious sociological conception of modern times’.[31] Fascism took elitism a step further, however, by promoting Max Weber’s notion of charismatic leadership and Friedrich Nietzsche’s idea of the Übermensch, the “superman”, a supremely gifted individual who lives according to his own will and desires with unquestionable political leadership and authority.[32] This “superman” could manipulate the emotionally susceptible masses through ‘dormant religious impulses’, which ultimately assumed a cult.[33] This was put into practice through the principle that “Mussolini is always right”, which became fascist dogma, with Mussolini assuming the title of “Il Duce”. By 1935, the cult of Duce had come to consume Mussolini, convinced that he was the only reliable leader of Italy, and by 1938 he had become increasingly insular to the point that he took almost no notice of those outside his personal inner circle.[34]

 

Anti-rationalism

 

In the late 19th century some thinkers had begun to highlight the limits of reason, with humans instead being motivated by powerful drives, impulses, and mysticism, made coherent by the theory of vitalism. Intellectual life was devalued with emphasis placed upon upon instinct and impulse, with such thought described by contemporaries as having ‘the rudiments of a new religion’, as it was deemed beyond criticism.[35] Friedrich Nietzsche proposed that human beings are motivated by powerful emotions, their “will”, in what became known as the “will to power”.[36] Such thinking was particularly marked in Italy, led by Benedetto Croce, who rejected the intellectual as legislator, believing that conclusive classification was a denial of the openness of history and lived experience.[37] For Mussolini, anti-rationalism was pertinent as he believed Marxism had failed due to people been estranged from ‘the spirit of Marx’.[38] He believed man to be ‘an absurd animal’,[39] yet he also cautioned that ‘mystical and political aspects condition each other. One without the other is arid, the former without the latter loses itself in the fluttering of flags’.[40] Thus, Mussolini entertained both ‘a theory of motivation and a theory of truth’, in which he recognised the emotional motivations of man whilst highlighting the need to channel those emotions in a coherent manner.[41]

 

Violence, Action, and the State

 

Linked to anti-rationalism was the work of Georges Sorel, whom Mussolini was familiar with as early as 1904,[42] and whose influence was such that it moved Mussolini to state ‘that which I am… I owe to Sorel. He is an accomplished Master’.[43] Sorel emphasised revolutionary myths that made people act before they could calculate. This primarily meant the use of violence that would provide a sense of commitment, purpose, and solidarity, thereby ensuring the creation of a new revolutionary consciousness.[44] Violence would spur action and prevent people from dwelling upon abstract thinking, leading to Ernst Nolte describing Fascism as ‘a resistance to transcendence’.[45] Fascism believed that life required ‘incessant action’[46] that looked toward ‘last things, fruits, consequences, facts’.[47] Hence, Mussolini opted for ‘a philosophy of action’, with his favourite slogans including “Action not Talk” and “Inactivity is Death”, which explains his constantly active foreign policy.[48] Yet, Fascism dropped the anti-state nature of Sorelismo, in favour of a concept of extreme statism, built upon the work of Gramsci and Hegel, in that the state is the most appropriate and ethical means to resolve problems and lead the way to prosperity.[49] Such a worship of the state was summed up by the self-styled “Philosopher of Fascism”, Giovanni Gentile, in his phrase, ‘everything for the state; nothing against the state; nothing outside the state’.

 

Therefore, Mussolini developed a unique social and political thought of his own that included ‘the antiparliamentarian sociological tradition of Gumplowicz, Mosca, and Pareto, the radical syndicalist tradition of Sorel, and the nationalist tradition of Corradini’ with the unifying concepts being the the Gentilean notion of the state and the rejection of positivism.[50] Thus, by 1919, the general pattern of Mussolini’s ideological view was apparent with the specific and primary organisation of his thought having changed from class to the nation.

 

 

Personality

 

Prestige and Ego

 

Mussolini was keen to bring prestige back to the Italian nation that had been embarrassed and trampled upon since its birth in 1860. This marked an intention to eradicate the condescending attitude that many countries such as Britain displayed towards Italy. For example, Sir Augustus Paget, the British ambassador to Austria-Hungary, described Italy as ‘a nation of great children’, which aptly summaries the Anglo-Italian relationship of the liberal era, which was like that between teachers and pupils.[51] Mussolini believed that ignoble military defeats such as at Adowa in 1896 contributed to disregard towards Italy and thus he sought impressive military victories that would bring prestige to the nation.[52] Therefore, the invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 is not at all surprising, as the building of an empire would bring Italy up to the level of the Great Powers. The fallout from Abyssinia showcased Mussolini’s craving for prestige as he desperately sought de jure recognition of his conquest from Britain and France. This craving became ‘like a red rag to a bull to him’, but the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, refused to provide it, to the point that it seriously encumbered Anglo-Italian relations.[53] In the Spanish Civil War, despite continual failures, he was recalcitrant to withdraw his forces unless the USSR did the same, only adding to his deteriorating relations with Britain. Fuelling much of the desire for prestige was Mussolini’s great personal ego, reinforced by the cult of Duce, in which he ‘was never satisfied unless he was in the limelight playing a leading role’.[54] As the once Foreign Minister, Dino Grandi stated, ‘he considers himself the supreme Pontiff, not only in the spiritual but also in the material sense’.[55] Prestige and ego were always prominent but never as much so as from 1936 when Mussolini’s behaviour was ‘dictated by a giant-sized inferiority complex’, as Hitler’s dramatic foreign policy successes galled him.[56] Mussolini sought prestige for Italy by making it an equal of Germany and a powerful force in its own right, rather than a subservient assistant.[57] This showed in his April 1939 unilateral campaign in Albania and his lack of desire to collaborate with Germany at the beginning of World War Two until he was forced to do so by his disastrous campaign in Greece.

 

Emotional, Rash, and Tempestuous

 

Fascism’s promotion of anti-rationalism often showed in Mussolini’s tempestuous, short-tempered, and impulsive nature, which could prompt him into rash and violent moves.[58] As well as assaults on his political opponents, there was the assassination of General Tellini by Greeks in 1923, which prompted him to bomb Corfu. After the question of oil sanctions against Italy was raised after the invasion of Abyssinia, Mussolini threatened to break his alliance with France and leave the League of Nations, moving troops to the French border and hinting he may even bomb the Riviera.[59] Yet, it was his relations with Germany that accentuated his volatility the most. Despite the advice of all those around him, including Foreign Minister Ciano, the King, and the military chiefs, Mussolini ‘impetuously decided to go along with the Germans’, riled by the lack of de jure recognition.[60] As well as anger he was impulsively driven by greed as it seemed by June 1940 that Italy had much to gain and little to risk, with Mussolini greedily contemplating gains in the Balkans and Africa.[61]

 

Oscillation

 

Mussolini’s indecisive, action-orientated, and emotional personality contributed to an occasionally oscillating foreign policy, particularly after 1935, in which he made decisions ad hoc and often with wild U-turns. Despite generally being aligned with Britain and France, he could occasionally work against his allies, such as by attempting to stir up discontent within their empires. Indeed, Grandi stated that Italy was ‘with everybody and against everybody’.[62] Yet, an oscillating foreign policy is certainly not something that is unique to Mussolini. The Prussian sovereigns notably followed such a foreign policy as they faced ‘agonising choices between conflicting alliance commitments’,[63] thereby leading to a ‘pendulum policy’ of “Shaukelpolitik” in which a policy of oscillation was consciously followed.[64] Nonetheless, scholars such as Phillip Morgan have interpreted Mussolini’s actions negatively, as an intention to blackmail both sides for Italy’s gain.[65] Similarly, MacGregor Knox argues that such actions show how Fascists had come to rely on impulsive ‘brute force’ instead of calm, rational thought.[66] Indeed, in the 1920s, Mussolini’s oscillation was arguably a retort to specific unfavourable British and French policies. In the 1930s, however, it can be more accurately linked to Mussolini being apprehensive about the consequences of making a definitive decision to side with Germany or the democratic powers.[67] After 1935, he was keen to return to his previous state of relations with Britain but feared that he may be caught in the middle of Germany and the democracies, thereby remaining a second-rate power.

 

Statesmanlike

 

Morgan claims that Mussolini’s foreign policy ‘barely respected the norms of diplomatic activity’ and that his predilection was ‘to make trouble wherever he could and disparage the forms of conventional diplomacy’.[68] However, Mussolini many times actually demonstrated an ability as a responsible statesman. He could be charming, well-mannered, and easy to work with, speaking good German and French, as well as a little English.[69] He was quick to learn from his early days in which he was more a demagogue than a statesman with his growing relationship with Britain a sign of such progress. Denis Mack Smith argues that the 1925 Treaty of Locarno was ‘one of those many pieces of paper’ which Mussolini signed for no other reason than to avoid being left out in the lurch, but in reality Mussolini genuinely believed that Locarno improved the chances of a lasting peace in Europe.[70] Indeed, Mussolini was arguably the most prophetic of any European statesman with regards to the importance of curtailing the rising German threat. He argued for a “clean slate policy” in relation to reparations, and tried his best to prevent Anschluss, as well as initiating the Stresa Pact and the Four-Power Pact, both designed to bring peace to Europe.

 


 

The Internal Influence

 

Control

 

MacGregor Knox claims that a ‘cohesive establishment’ blocked Mussolini’s aims up to 1933, thereby preventing him from being able to devote himself to foreign policy.[71] However, whilst many actors such as the monarchy and the Church retained strong degrees of independence in what has been described as an ‘authoritarian compromise’,[72] they did not interfere nor pose a serious threat to Mussolini, especially his foreign policy, until the country’s implosion during World War Two. In actual fact, Mussolini was able to conduct foreign policy entirely as he wished due to his ability to exert control over the establishment, the mafia, and the Fascist Party. Key to his control was the way in which he made peace between the Church and the state. A concordat was signed, leading to the Lateran Pacts, which were so successful that they were later incorporated into the terms of the post-war Italian constitution. Furthermore, the Fascist Grand Council, created in December 1922, provided an executive under Mussolini’s leadership, whose agenda only he could control. This ensured appropriate management of the syndicates, which despite their cross-class pretensions, were actually in place to control the workers.[73]

 

 

 

Economic Challenges

 

By 1918, the Italian economy was far behind that of Britain and France, although it was not backwards in the way of Russia.[74] In the initial years of the Fascist era, Mussolini had to deal with the mass inflation and national debt that had resulted from World War One. Furthermore, Italy’s pattern of trade had been majorly altered with many export markets disappearing.[75] This weakened its ability to act coherently and with clout on the international stage.[76] Therefore, Italy depended upon the assistance of others or an opportunity to exploit Great Power rivalries in order to further its foreign policy ambitions. Mussolini responded to Italy’s economic challenges quite well, with various international commercial treaties helping to rapidly increase industrial output and metallurgical output, whilst output per worker also witnessed a vast improvement.[77] Yet, by 1939, Italian industrial output still paled in comparison with that of Britain and Germany, capable of only producing 25 percent of British output and 21 percent of German output.[78] Thus, Mussolini could not realistically contemplate acting alone against either the democracies or Germany, particularly given that 60 percent of Italian imports came through Gibraltar and Suez, which were controlled by the British and French navies.[79]

 

 

The Italian People

 

Mussolini’s popularity during the early years of Fascism was at times immense as his ‘considerable charm’ and ‘hypnotic personality’ intoxicated many who had felt directionless during the liberal period.[80] Yet, at the same time, he could also easily alienate people such as through the murder in June 1924 of Giacomo Matteotti, an outspoken critic of Fascism, which led to a sudden swing of public opinion against him.[81] With Mussolini sensitive to people’s thoughts of him, he was prone to attaining, or at least giving the allusion of, foreign policy success in order to keep public opinion favourable. This was most evident during the Abyssinian War, which ‘generated tremendous enthusiasm’ as Italy was seen to be banishing the failure of the liberal period to garner a Great Power rendering empire.[82] Such enthusiastic responses were influential upon the egoistical Mussolini, rendering him ‘dangerously overconfident’.[83] However, by 1938, Mussolini was becoming increasingly absorbed within the cult of Duce, believing himself to be like Nietzsche’s Übermensch and thus above criticism.[84] He therefore began to lose interest in public opinion, which had started to turn against him. Italians were witnessing ‘a growing uneasiness and a kind of internal psychological distancing from the radicalisation of Fascism’ that pertained to intervention in the Spanish Civil War and the anti-Semitic laws motivated by the German alliance.[85] They had been keen to see the establishment of an empire in East Africa but they did not want a major war in Europe.[86] However, believing himself to be the all-knowing leader, Mussolini paid little attention to his people until war became a reality in late 1939.

 

Margherita Sarfatti

 

Margherita Sarfatti, a political journalist and one of Italy’s leading art critics, became Mussolini’s mistress and exerted great influence upon his first thirteen years in power. Such was her influence that it moved the notable composer and close friend, Alma Mahler, to describe her as ‘the uncrowned Queen of Italy’.[87] Sarfatti’s constant companionship led to her exerting great influence over Mussolini’s foreign policy, acting as a ‘moderating influence’ upon his often emotional reactions to events.[88] She was pro-British, pro-French, and anti-German, steering him towards cooperation with the democratic powers.[89] After her husband Cesare died, she moved to Rome in 1927, which strengthened her power and concentrated her policymaking role yet further.

 

By 1935, however, Sarfatti’s influence had begun to wane as she lost her sexual attraction for Mussolini, who had begun to listen to the demands of his wife Rachele that he end his affair with Sarfatti.[90] Furthermore, her art, which identified with a broader international current, was increasingly viewed as a threat to Italian national identity by ultranationalists, who were supported by her opponents for quick political gain.[91] Consequently, Mussolini increasingly ignored Sarfatti’s advice such as her pleas to abandon the ‘dangerous adventure’ in Abyssinia.[92] With Sarfatti emigrating to South America in fear of her life and Mussolini now enamoured by the pro-Nazi Clara Petacci, it is unsurprising that Mussolini’s tempestuous and fluctuating personality became more effectual. The result was wars in Abyssinia and Spain, deteriorating relations with Britain and France, and ultimately war alongside Germany.


 

Chapter Two: Mussolini and the International System

 

Competition: Revisionism and Expansionism

 

Mussolini was certainly not a straight forward backer of the status quo, holding a desire to bring Italy to the level of Britain and France. In order to achieve such power, Mussolini felt it necessary to create an Italian empire, with his sights set keen upon the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and East Africa. A key motivator of expansionism was that Italians believed they had not obtained the fruits of victory from World War One in the way of their allies, and that promised gains such as central Dalmatia had not been realised. Victory was considered a “vittoria mutilata” (mutilated victory) that had failed to justify the sacrifices of the war.[93] As a result, there lingered ‘frustrated nationalism and the desire for revenge’ that resulted in the creation of a “League of the Oppressed Peoples” or “League of Fiume”, which aimed to coordinate a revisionist position.[94] Some have linked this revisionist desire to the Fascist ideological idea that ‘only competition and conflict guarantee human progress’.[95] This has led some scholars to claim that Italy was fundamentally opposed to the domination of Britain and France. These authors have cited Mussolini’s supposed aim ‘to demolish the British Empire’, through aiding natives such as Indians and Zionists, as an example of the competition and struggle inherent to Fascism.[96]

Mussolini’s revisionism was particularly centred around the Balkans, especially regarding the ultimately successful acquisition of Fiume and the unsatisfactory Rapallo Treaty of 1920. Mussolini’s relationship with Yugoslavia was characterised by constant attempts to undermine the new state such as through aiding Croat separatists, which led to the assassination of the Yugoslav King, Alexander I, and the French Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou, in 1934.[97] In Albania, Luigi Villari claims that Italy’s policy was a purely passive one, as Italy did not wish to occupy the country but merely wanted to prevent others from doing so.[98] However, this is difficult to sustain given Italy’s annexation of Albania in 1917, the enraged response at having the new possession removed from its grasp in 1920, and intention’s to colonise Albania after its incorporation into the Italian Empire as an autonomous province in 1939.[99] Other areas of interest were the Mediterranean, with Mussolini frequently cited as intending to turn the sea into ‘an Italian lake’,[100] and Africa in which a new Roman empire could be forged that would emulate the empires of Britain and France and thus would boost Italian Great Power status.[101]

 


 

Cooperation

 

A revisionist and expansionist foreign policy, however, did not mean that Mussolini would launch war just for the sake of it. Whilst by no means adhering exactly to the letter of the law in international conduct, Mussolini was far from a tyrannical dictator hell-bent on taking over the world, like Hitler. Indeed, his expansionist desires were not much different to those of pre-war liberal governments, which had long held ambitions to control the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, and parts of Africa, exemplified by the 1911 invasion of Libya.[102] Instead, Mussolini, was more inclined to work with, rather than against, the European balance, which was well-received given that ‘Fascist Italy was often viewed in the Western democracies as a relatively benign regime’.[103] Mussolini was aware of Italy’s domestic limitations and thus had no desire to participate in a major European war.[104] Italy could ill afford an arms race, particularly given the spending cuts necessitated by the Great Depression and the forces required to pacify Libya in the 1920s. Even regarding the supposed Soviet ideological enemy, Mussolini maintained favourable relations until the Spanish Civil War as the first of the victor states to officially recognise the USSR and the one with the largest consular network.[105]

 

Mussolini’s wariness and displeasure at the way Hitler ignored diplomatic negotiations and non-state actors such as the International Boundary Commission give an insight into his inclination to largely work cooperatively with the Great Powers to achieve his revisionist aims.[106] In contrast to Hitler, Mussolini made constructive contributions to multilateral fora such as the 1930-32 Disarmament Conference, whilst constantly pushing for a ‘directorate of the Great Powers’ that would establish the future of Europe.[107] Until the Abyssinian War, Italy had been ‘a dutiful member of the League of Nations’ by making a number of constructive contributions to the League, such as a resolution to the Corfu question, which had put Italy on good enough terms with Britain and France to secure it treaty arrangements regarding Fiume, Somaliland, and Libya.[108] Those of the pro-Germany line of thinking see Mussolini as fundamentally opposed to the League of Nations due to Fascism’s theoretical rejection of the equality of nations. In reality, however, Mussolini’s foreign policy showed a great amount of respect for Britain in particular. The notion of international inequality was thus more pertinent regarding ‘petty states’, which were viewed as having an influence incommensurate with their actual importance and the League deemed too rigid to solve this issue.[109] It was not until the Abyssinian War that Mussolini’s relationship with the League fell apart, but this was more because the League was largely under the direction of Britain and France, whom he was currently in dispute with, than due to an inherent disdain for it. The reason he had remained supportive of the League was his recognition of the need for a Franco-German settlement in order to maintain lasting peace in Europe. To this end, he had initiated the Four-Power Pact between Britain, Italy, France, and Germany, which could have been highly successful had France ratified the treaty.[110] Mussolini later lamented that he had lost a lot of hope for a peaceful solution once the Pact had failed.[111] In order to curtail German aggression Mussolini had also organised the “Stresa Front” in April 1935, composed of Britain, France, and Italy. The alliance would likely have checked Germany at a time when it and its leader were still relatively weak, but was broken by the engagement in Abyssinia and the opposition of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.[112] Therefore, Mussolini’s foreign policy was far from reckless or warmongering, but instead that of ‘a responsible statesman seeking to preserve peace’, whilst at the same time working to improve the position and status of his country.[113]

 

 


 

Chapter Three: Abyssinia and its Aftermath

 

The Abyssinian War: 1935-36

 

Mussolini’s decision to invade Abyssinia on 3rd October 1935 was not an irrational, fervent one taken lightly. It is true that Mussolini was motivated by colonial glory and the chance to erase the memory of the humbling defeat at Adowa in 1896. However, he was well aware that he ‘could not launch a campaign in East Africa if Britain and France forbade him to do so’.[114] Therefore, in December 1925 he had engineered an agreement with Britain, which ‘virtually gave Italy a free hand in Abyssinia’ but French opposition led to it being dropped.[115] However, with Pierre Laval as French Prime Minister in the 1930s, France began to back Italian claims. The “Laval Pact” effectively promised Mussolini ‘a free hand in Abyssinia, both economically and militarily’, leading to Mussolini feeling confident that there would be no objections to an invasion, particularly given that Japanese aggression in Manchuria had not been condemned.[116] Furthermore, the British “Maffey Report”, which Mussolini subsequently published in Il Giornale d’Italia, stated that Britain had no vital interests in Ethiopia and thus Italy ought to be allowed to colonise Abyssinia.[117] As Mussolini himself stated just days before the invasion, ‘in 1925 Sir Ronald Graham and I signed an Agreement which practically cut Abyssinia to pieces’.[118] Thus, Mussolini had worked cooperatively with the major powers to come to an agreement that effectively gave him the green light to invade Abyssinia. He had been motivated by territorial greed and enhanced status but It was a skilful use of friendly diplomacy within the system that had enabled the invasion.

 

Ultimately, the biggest consequence of the war was that it initiated the process whereby Mussolini became increasingly estranged from the Western powers, and became closer to Germany. The use of poison gas has been cited as a key contribution to this,[119] but in reality Britain and France were no strangers to such practices themselves. For example, Britain had sanctioned poison gas to be used to quell disturbances in Mesopotamia in 1920, with Winston Churchill in favour of using it as a permanent method of warfare.[120] Another cited cause was Abyssinia’s membership of the League of Nations, which meant that it was formally entitled to military support from fellow members, but most British and French officials were prepared to avoid this.[121] There was also the imposition of sanctions upon Italy, which only served to push Mussolini towards Hitler, who was more than happy to provide Italy with economic aid.[122] However, the key cause of tension was that Britain and France refused to provide de jure recognition of the conquest. Partly, this was due to negative British public opinion, the extent of which had been demonstrated by the outrage the Hoare-Laval Plan received, which had proposed to allow Italy territory in East Africa as an economic monopoly.[123] Primarily, though, it was due to the workings of the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden.

 

Eden had been granted a great deal of power in the handling of foreign affairs by Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin.[124] His refusal to grant de jure was motivated by a particular hatred for Mussolini that almost amounted to a ‘personal vendetta’.[125] He described the Italian leader as ‘a complete gangster’ who was trying to blackmail Britain.[126] Eden deplored Italy’s intervention in the Spanish Civil War, adamant that de jure must not be granted whilst Italian troops remained in the country.[127] The lack of recognition greatly aggravated Mussolini, whose desire for de jure became obsessive.[128] Mussolini despised Eden, who he described after one particular violent quarrel as ‘a vehement enemy of Italy’.[129] Eden’s mistrust of Mussolini was in contrast to his position towards Hitler, whom he was more inclined to trust.[130] He fervently refused to believe that Abyssinia and the later Spanish Civil War were ‘mere side shows compared with Hitler’s fanatical determinism’ to take over Europe.[131] This is despite the militarisation of the Rhineland and the British Embassy in Berlin stating that Germany would soon become unattackable and was guaranteed to seek territorial expansion.[132]

 

Eden’s mistrust of Italy appears to be unique within the Foreign Office and the Conservative Party. He was often ‘at loggerheads with his colleagues’ who feared that cold-shouldering Mussolini would drive the Italian leader towards Hitler, and thus advocated de jure recognition.[133] Eden fought against the new Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, who was keen to concede de jure and enjoyed a decent relationship with Mussolini.[134] Yet, Chamberlain was either unwilling or unable to assert his authority and remove Eden. Mussolini’s desire may have been unreasonable but the British Ambassador to Italy, Eric Drummond, made it very clear that if de jure was not granted Mussolini was likely to conclude a political and military alliance with Germany.[135] The Abyssinian War’s significance in this regard is thus so great that it can be considered ‘a watershed in Mussolini’s foreign policy’.[136] One is thus inclined to agree with Sisley Huddleston, one of the most informed and most distinguished journalists of the era, who noted Eden’s ‘record of failure’ regarding de jure as fundamental to causing World War Two.[137]

 


 

The Spanish Civil War: 1936-39

 

Despite apathy from the Italian people, Mussolini intended to mould a satellite state in Spain that could help establish the new Roman Empire.[138] With Mussolini upset with the lack of de jure and his ego bruised, he intended to forge a relationship with Spain that could help diminish Britain’s stranglehold over the Mediterranean. Despite the Spanish rebels not being strictly Fascist, Franco’s regime still largely identified with Fascism.[139] Spurred on by his victory in Abyssinia, Mussolini invested heavily in the war, providing a large number of troops, submarines, and weapons for the fight. In fact, such was the extent of Italian intervention, Italy’s military effectiveness in World War Two was heavily compromised.[140] Italian forces engaged in the bombing of towns and ships, including British merchant shipping. However, due to Franco’s intentions for neutrality, as well as clashes between Spaniards and Italians during the war, the satellite state Mussolini hoped to achieve failed to materialise.[141]

 

Britain and France did not retaliate against naked Italian aggression, despite attacks upon their merchant shipping, leading Mussolini to think he had a free hand in the country.[142] Much of this was due to a fear of Bolshevism that was particularly prevalent in the British Conservative Party and had done much to stimulate relations with Mussolini in previous years.[143] By the end of August 1936, most European governments had officially subscribed to the “Non Intervention in Spain Agreement” and ultimately ended up recognising Franco’s new government. A negative British and French reaction would have likely prevented both Italian and German involvement in the conflict because neither was yet ready for confrontation with the democracies, as was revealed at the Nuremburg Trials.[144] Italian involvement in Spain ended up exacerbating antagonisms as Eden demanded a withdrawal in order to provide de jure recognition of Abyssinia. However, Mussolini refused to do so unless the USSR did the same, thereby leading to a stalemate. Eden could not see that Spain was a side-issue compared to Germany, and the process of Anglo-Italian estrangement and German-Italian cordiality that had begun in Abyssinia took another fateful step. As Grandi later said, ‘Spain was a slow and progressive illness… [that] created a growing abyss between Italy and Great Britain and paved the path for the Anti-Comintern Pact and military cooperation between Hitler and Mussolini’.[145]

 


 

Chapter Four: (In)compatibilities in International Relations

 

Germany

 

Racism

 

MacGregor Knox claims that ‘Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were united in persecution of their Jewish minorities’ and that Mussolini mounted an ‘insistent racist campaign’.[146] Others have claimed that Mussolini had become ‘personally committed to an Italian Fascist racism’.[147] Such claims are largely based upon the 1938 Manifesto of Race, which in theory emphasised that all races had a biological foundation and placed various restrictions on Jews. However, Fascist Italy cannot be considered rife with anti-Semitism like Nazi Germany, particularly before 1938. The “Fundamental Ideas” of the Dottrina of 1932 contained but a single pertinent reference to race and that was to ‘dismiss it as the material foundation of the nation’.[148] Jews enjoyed equal status within Italy, unlike many other countries of the time. Intermarriage was particularly high, integration had largely been achieved, and no Fascist leader was allowed to publicly attack Jews before the birth of the Axis.[149] In fact, Nazi ideologues, including the chief racial theorist Alfred Rosenberg, attacked Mussolini’s ‘injudicious tolerance’ of Jews and his apparent lack of understanding of the Jewish question.[150] Mussolini’s personal relationships with Jews witnessed little systematic bias, namely his long and enduring friendships with Margherita Sarfatti and Angelica Balabanoff. There were more than 10,000 Jewish members in the Fascist Party by 1938, with many being prominent figures, even after the racial laws, such as cabinet member Aldo Finzi and the long-serving Minister of Finance, Guido Jung.[151] The racial concepts adopted by the Nazis were openly mocked by Mussolini, who denounced ‘the delirium of race’, claiming that it did not exist in Italy.[152] Even after 1938, many Italians such as Gaetano Mosca, Luigi Franzi, and Aldo Capasso scathingly critiqued biological racism, with Mussolini later lamenting that, ‘the manifesto on race could have been avoided. It is a scientific abstruseness of certain scholars and journalists, a German text translated into bad Italian’.[153] Indeed, there is a wealth of evidence to show that the racial laws were very weakly implemented with several exemptions and systematic efforts to obstruct attempts to persecute Jews.[154] During World War Two, the Italian occupied zones of France, Yugoslavia, and Greece became havens of refuge for the Jews of those countries, with persecution and deportation only fully implemented once the Germans took over in 1943, and even then with much obstruction.[155] Ultimately, such actions meant that 80 percent of Italian Jews survived the war compared to 25 percent in Germany.[156]

 

Some authors of nationalism have claimed that the self-identity of nations is often secured through the construction of inferior “alien” internal others.[157] This was particularly the case in Fascist Italy regarding the Slavs of north-eastern Italy, and the Germans of the South Tyrol whose differences were deemed a threat to the homogeneity of the Italian nation.[158] The Slavs and Germans were purged of their “foreignness” and Italianised in order to suit the nationalist requirements.[159] In the South Tyrol, residents were subject to “The Option” in 1939 whereby they had to choose either German citizenship and move, or stay and retain Italian citizenship, with 86 percent choosing to leave.[160] Annamaria Vinci argues that the intolerance of difference provided a basis upon which the politically motivated anti-Semitic campaigns could be built.[161] However, key to Italian Fascism was the notion that various nationalities would be treated equally and positively if they were prepared to recognise only the Italian nation, unlike in Germany where certain groups could never be part of the nation. In that sense, it was not that Fascism had a specific ideological disdain for Slavs or Germans, but more that there was no room for difference in what was supposed to be a monolithic society.[162] The “allogeni” were imagined to ‘invigorate the stock’[163] and ‘with time… could become truly Italian, even in sentiment’.[164] Thus, it was more ultranationalism than racism, with Mussolini’s use of the term race being coterminous with nation. He spoke of the “British race”, the “French race”, and even of races within Italy such as “Genoese” and “Piedmontese”.[165] Any opposition to Judaism therefore came from a desire to prevent dual loyalties, potentially in this case to Zionism, just like with any other minority group in Italy. Thus, Italian Fascism embraced all groups as part of the nation if they proclaimed it to be their priority.

 

Peter Neville claims that the Nazis did not put Mussolini under pressure to introduce an anti-Semitic campaign.[166] This may be true but the German relationship meant that Mussolini felt compelled to reduce the psychological distance between the Fascist Italy and the National Socialist Germany, in order to solidify the Pact of Steel.[167] The adoption of racial laws was thus a short-term, opportunistic attempt to convince Hitler of Italian support, rather than a key aspect of Fascist doctrine.[168] This is not an attempt to absolve Mussolini of blame regarding the Holocaust but instead it is an argument pertaining to his intentions. Without the German relationship, the anti-Semitic laws would very unlikely have been implemented given that hitherto Italian Fascism had existed without anti-Semitism. Far from a deliberate anti-Semitic impulse, the racial laws exemplified Italy’s ‘surrender of independence’ and demonstrated how Mussolini had come to be Hitler’s assistant rather than his superior or even his equal.[169]

 

Austria

 

Knox claims that Mussolini ‘deliberately encouraged’ Hitler to make Austria a satellite state of Germany and replace him as Austria’s protector.[170] However, this entirely misses Mussolini’s fears of German-Austrian unification, known as Anschluss. Mussolini considered it vital to have Austria under Italian influence given the new ethnic groups Italy had gained from Austria after World War One,[171] and the historical antagonistic relationship between Italians and Austrians that dated back to 1815, which he felt Germany may exploit.[172] Indeed, several Austrian leaders had believed that the Italian state ought to be ‘fundamentally destroyed’.[173] To this end, Mussolini developed a strong friendship with the Austrian leader Engelbert Dollfuss, together establishing the Rome Protocols in March 1934, along with Hungary, that committed the three countries to military combination and economic cooperation in order to prevent Germany from gaining influence in Austria. Hitler had written on the very first page of Mein Kampf that the annexation of Austria was his first foreign policy target and indeed he attempted a coup in 1934 that led to the murder of Dollfuss. Mussolini was so enraged by the murder that Oswald Mosely, who had seen him a few days afterwards, believed him to be contemplating war on Germany.[174] Mussolini responded by moving troops to the Austrian frontier and promised Austria military aid, which forced Hitler to abjectly climb down. This was clear opposition to Hitler, with Mussolini concluding that Italy must prepare for war ‘not tomorrow but today’ in order to fight the threat of Germany.[175] Britain and France only offered a meek declaration reaffirming the independence of Austria but would not provide firm support for Mussolini in fear that it would antagonise Hitler, who they were attempting to appease.[176] The eventual Anschluss of 1938 came about as tensions caused by Italian actions in Abyssinia and Spain hindered the implementation of the Stresa Front that could have warned Hitler away once again. Mussolini was ‘seriously perturbed by the fall of Austria’, which was very unpopular with the Italian people.[177] He realised that Britain and France would not help him control the increasingly powerful Germany that was now on Italy’s northern frontier. As a result, it was only natural that Italy would move closer to Germany in the face of the British and French cold response to the situation, lest he be stuck in no man’s land with a powerful threat to the north.

 

Hitler

 

Hitler claimed to have the ‘most profound admiration for the man south of the Alps’, whose rise to power in the 1920s had impressed him sufficiently to seek closer ties.[178] He long-held a belief that Italian Fascism was the equal Italian version of National Socialism and insisted upon Mussolini’s liberation in the Gran Sasso raid of 1943.[179] Mussolini, on the other hand, had little love for the Führer whom he ‘disliked and feared’.[180] Mussolini had considered Hitler and his associates to be ‘buffoons’ and lacking in any finesse since their failed Munich Putsch of 1923.[181] This disdain turned to outright hostility after the murder of Dollfuss, which led to Fascist publications describing Hitler as the “anti-Christ”.[182] Their first meeting in June 1934 was a disaster as Hitler monopolised the conversation and the two strongly clashed over the Austrian question.[183] Even as alliance partners, many differences of opinion grew between the leaders, particularly as Mussolini grew increasingly resentful of suggestions of similarity, ‘believing himself to be the great statesman of the era’.[184] Mussolini was further irritated by Hitler’s lack of consultation on decisions such as the Czechoslovakian coup, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and Operation Barbarossa.[185] The latter led to Mussolini exclaiming, ‘that tragic buffoon stubbornly seeks a victory in Russia that is completely out of the question’.[186] Therefore, an overview of Hitler and Mussolini’s personal relationship shows the extent of Mussolini’s dislike of the Führer caused by ego, personality differences, and conflicting interests. Thus, Mussolini was far from happy about having to ally himself with a man whom he fundamentally disliked, disrespected, and intended to disavow.

 

Ideological Differences and Italian-German Relations

 

Knox claims that Mussolini ‘actively strove’ for a German alliance that he had long been looking forward to in order to crush Britain and France.[187] In fact, Knox believes that Mussolini and Hitler were linked in what he describes as a ‘common destiny’.[188] Likewise, Phillip Morgan believes that there was ‘no possibility of disengagement from the Axis’.[189] This is based upon the belief that Mussolini wanted a powerful German ally that offered ‘a profound destabilisation of the European balance of power’.[190] Knox and Morgan join many others who are of the opinion that the Axis pact was implicit in the similar expansionist visions of the German and Italian systems.[191] Such scholars have viewed Fascism as an international movement with shareable characteristics. There were, of course, similarities between the two systems, namely their ‘ferocious totalitarian will’, intolerance of difference, and fear of Bolshevism.[192] However, such a line of thinking emphasises too much on reductive logic that does not seriously examine the ideology of Fascism.[193] As was claimed in a 1935 article in Gerarchia, Fascist Italy’s most prominent journal, the differences between Fascism and Nazism were ‘profound and unambiguous’,[194] but with the Axis alliance, ‘rivalries became blurred’.[195] In reality, the alliance was concluded because Mussolini’s prestige-driven nature meant that the notion of neutrality with no close allies was abhorrent to him.[196] Knox points to Italian atrocities such as mass shootings, large-scale population transfers, concentration camps, and the use of mustard gas in Libya and Yugoslavia as evidence of a similar violent streak to Germany.[197] However, whilst Mussolini’s Italy was violent, brutal, and repressive, it was not murderous and bloodthirsty like Nazi Germany, with far fewer political prisoners.[198] If atrocities are a mark of compatibility then one could pick from a long list of British and French atrocities. In reality, ‘the word fascismo has no meaning beyond Italy’ but Fascism has often been conflated with Nazism based upon the concept of totalitarianism, thereby producing many unfortunate clichés.[199] Fascist Italy indeed centred around the totalitarian state but this did not include structural and institutional day-to-day control as in Germany.[200] Furthermore, the latter espoused the primary role of race, as well as a distinctly anti-modern philosophy, whilst Italian Fascism was eager to portray itself as a modernising and regenerative force embracing technology and Futurism.[201]

 

Such distinctions show up when examining Italian feelings towards Germany, which were generally very negative with ill-feeling coming from all areas of society. In addition to Mussolini’s personal dislike of the German leader, both the King and the Pope were bitterly anti-Hitler, the former viewing him as a ‘psycho-degenerate’.[202] Ciano, whom Mussolini was often open to the influence of, had become a convinced anti-Nazi by 1939 and in turn the German leadership had come to hate him.[203] In November 1937, Grandi attacked the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, for having ‘demonstrated the traditional German quality of being an elephant walking on plates’.[204] Italians grew increasingly restive with an undesired European war and pseudo-Nazification embodied by the Manifesto of Race, with Mussolini for the first time in years taking the people’s feelings into consideration, which he expressed in a hostile letter to Hitler in January 1940.[205] Mussolini had no desire for a European war, especially in Hitler’s interests. He ‘begged Hitler to find a political solution’ when war broke out,[206] with Ciano noting that ‘never has the Duce spoken of the need for peace so unreservedly and with so much warmth’.[207] The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact particularly contributed to Mussolini’s disillusion with Germany as he vacillated between backing Hitler and siding with the West. Hitler’s interpreter, Paul Schmidt, believed an Anglo-Italian pact to be possible, stating that Mussolini and Ciano had ‘their eyes still turned westwards’.[208] Such was Mussolini’s disillusionment with Hitler, that he provided the Belgian and Dutch ambassadors in Rome with information that the German Blitzkreig attack was imminent.[209] Therefore, given the strident differences regarding race, the ideological differences between National Socialism and Fascism, fears of a powerful Germany in Austria and elsewhere in Europe, Mussolini and other’s dislike of Hitler, and the desire to avoid a European war, it seems incongruous to argue that Hitler and Mussolini had a “common destiny”. There were clear ideological differences between Italy and Germany that created barriers to cooperation and made Mussolini wary and even disdainful of a possible German alliance. Hitler and Mussolini were thus not the obvious and natural bedfellows that many have described.


 

The West

 

United States

 

The United States was conspicuous by its absence in international and European affairs, on account of its isolationist policy that led to a tough neutrality bill during the summer of 1935. Mussolini’s relationship with the United States was strong for a long time, having received highly favourable terms from President Coolidge on the £415 million that Italy owed in World War One debts.[210] He had developed a relationship with Franklin D. Roosevelt even before the American was inaugurated, with Roosevelt looking towards Italy as an important ally in Europe.[211] Indeed, Mussolini’s popularity in the U.S. was considerable, and, according to John Diggins, ‘Mussolini’s Fascist dictatorship drew more admiration from democratic America than from any other Western nation’.[212] Thus, it was not until 1937 that Mussolini began to take a more negative position vis-à-vis the U.S. but it seemed that a war between the two would be unlikely, especially given the large Italian-American community.

 

 

 

 

France

 

During the Fascist period, many French Cabinets had Leftist tendencies, leading to the country becoming a haven for Italian anti-Fascists whose violence against Fascists in France country was often ignored by the authorities.[213] Mussolini’s claims to Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, and parts of the Balkans, as well as a desire to control the Mediterranean caused tension between the two countries. This was particularly so in the Balkans, especially after the assassination of Louis Barthou and the Yugoslav king. France was also wary of Italian involvement in Africa, leading it to prompt Abyssinia to apply for League of Nations membership in order to ‘clip British and Italian wings in East Africa’.[214] It was also wary of Italian designs on French-controlled Tunisia, where Mussolini encouraged opposition movements to fight against French colonial rule.[215]

 

It is therefore unsurprising that Italy regarded France as ‘the rock of reaction’.[216] Many Italians, including the King, viewed France as hostile to the Italian nation, with cries of “Corsica!” greeting the French Ambassador upon one public appearance.[217] Mussolini’s ‘underlying hostility to France’,[218] was strengthened by a lack of de jure recognition and an assassination attempt upon him by a French-born individual in 1926. Such an attitude often led to him inspiring and writing hysterical anti-French articles, including one in which he stated, ‘I spit on France’, which were in contrast to his more conciliatory moves towards Britain.[219] Yet, despite antagonistic rhetoric, both countries did agree on key topics, notably the German question, at least until appeasement became popular. Mussolini promised to support France if Germany entered the demilitarised Rhineland and agreed with France, in the face of British opposition, on the need for sanctions after Germany breached the treaties of Versailles and Locarno.[220] Certain French politicians, namely Aristide Briand and Pierre Laval, held Mussolini ‘in great esteem and had sincere sympathy with him’, which contributed to Laval agreeing to the Rome Accords that effectively gave Italy the right to Abyssinia.[221] However, Édouard Déladier, the three-time prime minister of France who led the country into World War Two, was strongly anti-Fascist to the extent that he forbade Neville Chamberlain from discussing Italian claims with Mussolini.[222] Even when Mussolini made reconciliatory moves, Déladier refused to trust or move towards him, which was key to continuing the Italian-German alliance.

 

Britain: Tensions

 

Phillip Morgan claims that ‘a study of Mussolini’s actions indicates that it was neither intended nor possible’ for relations with Britain.[223] Instead, he argues that Mussolini intended to benefit at the expense of the ‘imperialist powers’.[224] MacGregor Knox similarly claims that Mussolini wanted to secure geopolitical independence, which inevitably meant defeating Britain.[225] Indeed, at various times Mussolini hoped that the British Empire might break up and offer Italy a chance for expansion, thereby prompting British wariness. Notably, he gave private assurances to Islamic and Indian revolutionaries that he would give them every assistance, whilst publicly he founded an Indo-Italian commercial institute.[226] In his early years in power Mussolini was particularly petulant, encouraging the Italian press to adopt a bitterly anti-British line after a disagreement, such as Britain’s desire not to militarily occupy the Ruhr in 1922.[227] Indeed, when it suited, he would become a champion of Irish independence.[228] After 1935, Anglo-Italian relations deteriorated rapidly as a lack of British support in Austria, combined with the tensions over Abyssinia, de jure, and Spain, forced the two countries apart. As Ciano noted, the Anti-Comintern Pact was ‘unmistakeably anti-British’.[229] Mussolini’s petulant attitude revealed itself again during this period with anti-British campaigns that were carried out during the Abyssinian and Spanish crises but these should be considered to be a means to an end rather than an end in themselves. They were not a symptom of anti-Britishness but a foreign policy tactic designed to force Britain to change its mind, as Britain was Italy’s intended partner.

 

However, such erratic, tempestuous, and devious antics did cause wariness and alarm in Britain. Initially, after the bombardment of Corfu, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, mistrusted Mussolini, describing him as a ‘dangerous demagogue, plausible in manner but without scruple in truth or conduct’.[230] Naturally, the British Left were particularly wary of Mussolini, with the New Statesman, which came to be banned in Italy, declaring in 1924 that ‘the Fascists are in their methods as barbarous as the Bolsheviks’.[231] Differences with the British Left rendered discussions tense during the Labour government of 1929-1931. The Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, was a veteran of the Labour movement and disliked Mussolini due to his suppression of the trade unions and cooperatives.[232] Indeed, later in the 1930s, nearly all Labour and Liberal MPs backed Anthony Eden in his policy towards Mussolini.[233]

 

British public opinion rendered the British government uncomfortable during the Abyssinian crisis. The feelings of the British public were demonstrated in the “Peace Ballot” of 27 June 1935 in which over ten million people said military measures should be taken against a League member violating the Covenant, whilst 13 million were in favour of non-military measures.[234] The leaked Hoare-Laval Plan designed to settle the Abyssinian issue was met with outrage from home, as were proposals to remove sanctions, ultimately leading to both plans being shelved. Furthermore, the British public were ‘violently hostile to Italian participation in the Spanish Civil War’, particularly after the Italian bombing of British merchant ships.[235] British public opinion therefore made the granting of de jure difficult for British officials but most, except Eden, had come to the realisation, as uncomfortable as it was to go against the British people, that it was necessary to cooperate with Mussolini.[236]

Britain: Harmony and Cooperation

 

The British people may have specifically opposed Italian violence in Abyssinia and Spain but many Westerners still sympathised with Fascism. Indeed, the widespread acclaim within the Conservative government for Mussolini goes to show how decisive Eden’s intervention was as he seemed to be the only individual in the Cabinet against Mussolini. In contrast to its reputation in the 21st century, ‘Fascism was not perceived in the 1920s as the face of evil’ with Britain actually subsidising Il Popolo d’Italia.[237] Mussolini appeared to be ‘a redeemer of virtue, a restorer of conservative order and tradition’, which was in opposition to the narrow minority interest pursued in liberal societies.[238] For the Right, Fascism was a force against trade unionism and ‘a bulwark against the spread of Russian Communism in Europe’.[239] Many notable individuals respected Mussolini such as King George V, who upon his visit to Rome in 1923 praised Mussolini for displaying ‘the wise guidance of a strong statesman’.[240] Even the Labour Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald greatly admired Mussolini for his advanced social legislation and welfare institutions, leading to one colleague stating that ‘there is nothing more for the British Prime Minister to do but to don the Black Shirt in the streets of London’.[241] Two of the most important of Mussolini’s British admirers were Winston Churchill and Austen Chamberlain. Churchill hailed Mussolini as a ‘Roman genius’ and ‘the greatest lawgiver amongst living men’.[242] As Chancellor, he provided Italy with an extremely generous settlement of Italian war debts in 1926. This delighted Mussolini, who responded with a barrage of pro-British articles detailing British sacrifices and how the two countries were bound by a strong friendship.[243] Mussolini’s relationship with Chamberlain was vital to the period of strong Anglo-Italian relations until 1935.[244] Chamberlain was the ‘balm to Mussolini’s egoistical soul’,[245] and was key to defusing moments of tension such as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s drilling in Albania.[246] An agreement between the two men in December 1925 virtually gave Mussolini a free hand in Abyssinia and would later result in the misunderstanding that prompted the Abyssinian crisis.[247]

 

Conversely to the arguments of Knox and Morgan, Mussolini actively sought friendship with Britain, whom he viewed as the most moderate and level-headed of the Great Powers.[248] In fact, ‘his preference was for British friendship’ that would help deal with the German question.[249] He was joined in this regard by King Victor Emmanuel, who had ‘considerable sympathy for Britain’.[250] An important motivator of Mussolini’s positive inclination towards Britain was the ‘traditional British-Italian friendship’ of which he made constant referral.[251] This relationship had blossomed during the Italian struggle for independence and unification with the “black legend” of Austrian rule in Italy well-embedded within the British political imagination.[252] Especially during the high-point of relations in the 1920s, Mussolini emphasised the importance of Anglo-Italian relations, proclaiming in 1928 that ‘when we say that friendship between Italy and Great Britain is traditional, this is no more commonplace but expresses a factual reality’.[253] Even during the difficulties of the late 1930s, Mussolini wanted the disagreement over Abyssinia to be settled as soon as possible and that ‘bygones should be bygones’, with a fresh start to be made.[254] The Gentlemen’s Agreement of January 1937 and the Easter Accords of April 1938, highlight his intentions in this regard although they ultimately provided little of substance.[255] Mussolini was keen to revive the Stresa Front, as he realised the increasing danger that Hitler posed to Austria and the balance of power in Europe. He remained nostalgic for the pre-Abyssinian relationship and took pleasure from the positive overtures of Neville Chamberlain, who was popular among the Italian people.[256] Indeed, Mussolini had no desire for a European war and wanted to instigate another four-power conference like the Munich conference of 1938. Ultimately, however, the tensions caused by Eden’s refusal to provide de jure forced Mussolini towards Hitler, to the extent that it was unrecoverable.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

To conclude, this paper explored the intentions of Benito Mussolini’s foreign policy as leader of Italy. It found that Mussolini intended to bring prestige and Great Power status to Italy through the construction of an Italian empire and through increased involvement in European affairs. Mussolini’s foreign policy was pragmatic, unconventional, and at times devious but it was not destructive like that of Adolf Hitler. In contrast to the literature that describes Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany as natural and pre-destined alliance partners, this analysis found that Mussolini intended for an alliance with the Western powers of Britain and France. Moments of oscillation did occur but without significance until 1935. There were several key differences and points of friction between Italy and Germany, particularly surrounding race, Austria, Mussolini and other Italians’ dislike of Hitler, and the contrasting systems of Fascism and National Socialism. Thence, it is argued that the conflations of Mussolini and Hitler, of Italy and Germany, and of Fascism and National Socialism are misleading and inaccurate. Instead, it is noted that Mussolini intended to achieve his aims by largely working within the international system and having solid working relations with France and, in particular, Britain. Indeed, the British Conservative Party that was in power for the majority of the interwar period was very favourable towards Mussolini. A minority of the British Left also supported him, although the majority were very hostile, thus cautioning claims of full Anglo-Italian compatibility. During the 1920s and early 1930s, Mussolini’s sometimes petulant and tempestuous personality caused difficulties, but not fundamental ruptures, to what were positive relations with Britain and France. Indeed, Mussolini’s statesmanlike nous led to him organising initiatives such as the Four-Power Pact and the Stresa Front. This analysis points to the Abyssinian War of 1935, and its subsequent aftermath, as key in pushing Mussolini towards his eventual alliance with Hitler. An alliance with Germany was deemed the second best alternative, ahead of prestige-losing neutrality. The refusal of British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, to grant de jure recognition of the Abyssinian conquest, and Mussolini’s tempestuous response to this, set off a chain of events that resulted in World War Two. Without Eden’s critical intervention, it is likely that Mussolini would have sided with Britain and France against Germany. Whether this would have prevented a war is beside the point of this paper but Mussolini would likely not have been on Hitler’s side. Finally, future research should focus on further elucidating the contrasts between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in order to avoid unfortunate conflations. In this regard, all areas of research can benefit from such intellectual rigour.

 

 

 

Appendix

 

Figure 1: Timeline of key events

 

Bibliography

 

Adamthwaite, A. P. (1977) ‘The Making of the Second World War’. London: Allen & Unwin.

 

Allardyce, G. (1979) ‘What Fascism is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept’. The American Historical Review. 84(2). Pp. 367-388.

 

Alonso, A. M. (1994) ‘The Politics of Space, Time, and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity’. Annual Review of Anthropology. 23. Pp. 379-405.

 

Apih, E. (1966) ‘Italia: fascismo e antifascismo nella Venezia Giulia, 1918-1943’. Bari: Laterza.

 

Arrigoni, C. (1951) ‘La Fortuna editorial delle “Memorie Politiche” di Felice Orsini’. Risorgimento. 3. Pp. 98-99.

 

Avon, Earl of. (1962) ‘Memoirs: Facing the Dictators’. London: Cassell and Co.

 

Bacchin, E. (2015) ‘Felice Orsini and the Construction of the Pro-Italian Narrative in Britain’. In: Carter, N. (ed.) ‘Britain, Ireland and the Italian Risorgimento’. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 80-103.

 

Baer, G. W. (1967) ‘The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War’. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 

Balibar, E. (1990) ‘Paradoxes of Universality’. In: Goldberg, D. T. (ed.) ‘Anatomy of Racism’. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Pp. 283-294.

 

Bastianini, G. (1959) ‘Uomini, cose, fatti: Memorie di un ambasciatore’. Milan: Edizioni Vitagliano.

 

Beevor, A. (1982) ‘The Spanish Civil War’. London: Orbis Publishing.

 

Bellamy, R. (2014) ‘Croce, Gramsci, Bobbio, and the Italian Political Tradition’. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.

 

Bergson, H. ([1907] 1911) ‘Creative Evolution’. Translated by A. Mitchell. New York: Henry Holt & Company.

 

Bessis, J. (1981) ‘La Méditerranée fasciste’. Paris: Karthala.

 

Binchy, D. A. (1941) ‘Church and State in Fascist Italy’. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

 

Blass, S. (1940) ‘Der Rassegedanke: Seine biologische und philosophische Grundlegung’. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt.

 

Bongiorno, J. A. (1992) ‘Fascist Italy and the Disarmament Question, 1928-1934’. New York: Garland Publishing.

 

Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) ‘Mussolini’. London: Arnold.

 

Bracher, K. D. (1969) ‘Die deutsche Diktatur’. Berlin: Verlag Ullstein GmbH.

 

Bracher, K. D. (1976) ‘The Role of Hitler: Perspectives of Interpretation’. In: Laqueur, W. (ed.) ‘Fascism: A Reader’s Guide’. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp. 217-223.

 

Bullock, A. (1952) ‘Hitler: A Study in Tyranny’. Watford: Odhams Press.

 

Burgwyn, H. J. (1993) ‘The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy and the Great War, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1915-1919’. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

 

Cannistraro, P. V., and Sullivan, B. R. (1993) ‘Il Duce’s Other Woman: The Untold Story of Margherita Sarfatti, Benito Mussolini’s Jewish Mistress, and How She Helped Him Come to Power’. New York: William Morrow & Co.

 

Capasso, A. (1942) ‘Idee chiare sul razzismo’. Rome: Augustea.

 

Capogreco, C. S. (1987) ‘Ferramonti: la vita e gli uomini del più grande camp d’internamento fascista, 1940-1945’. Florence: Giuntina.

 

Carpi, D. (1977) ‘The Rescue of Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia’. In: Gutman, Y. (ed.) ‘Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust: Proceedings of the Second Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, April 1974’. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem.

 

Casanova, J. (2013) ‘The Spanish Civil War’. London: I. B. Tauris.

 

Chini, C. (2015) ‘Italy and the “Irish Risorgimento”: Italian Perspectives on the Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921’. In: Carter, N. (ed.) ‘Britain, Ireland and the Italian Risorgimento’. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 204-224.

 

Clark, C. (2007) ‘Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947’. London: Penguin Books.

 

Coffey, T. M. (1974) ‘Lion by the Tail: The Story of the Italian-Ethiopian War’. London: Hamish Hamilton.

 

Collotti, E. (2000) ‘Fascismo e politica di potenza: politica estera 1922-1939’. Milan: La Nuova Italia.

 

Corner, P. (2002) ‘State and Society, 1901-1922’. In: Lyttelton, A. (ed.) ‘Liberal and Fascist Italy’. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 17-43.

 

Coverdale, J. F. (1976) ‘Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War’. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

Croce, B. (1919) ‘Pagine sparse’. Naples: Laterza.

 

Cross, J. A. (1977) ‘Sir Samuel Hoare: A Political Biography’. London: Cape.

 

D’Aroma, N. (1958) ‘Mussolini segreto’. Rocca San Casciano: Cappelli.

 

De Begnac, Y. (1950) ‘Palazzo Venezia: storia di un regime’. Rome: La Rocca.

 

De Felice, R. (1952) ‘Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo’. Turin: Einaudi.

 

De Felice, R. (1971) ‘Le interpretazioni del fascismo’. Bari: Laterza

 

De Felice, R. (1981) ‘Mussolini il Duce, Vol. II: Lo stato totalitario, 1936-1940’. Turin: Einaudi.

 

De Felice, R. (1988) ‘Storia degli ebrei Italiani sotto il fascismo’. 4th Edition. Turin: Einaudi.

 

De Grazia, V. (1992) ‘How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922-1945’. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

Dell, R. (1940) ‘The Geneva Racket’. London: Robert Hale.

 

Diggins, J. (1966a) ‘Flirtation with Fascism: American Pragmatic Liberals and Mussolini’s Italy’. American Historical Review. 71(2). Pp. 487-506.

 

Diggins, J. (1966b) ‘Mussolini and America: Hero-Worship, Charisma, and the “Vulgar Talent”’. Historian. 28(4). Pp. 559-585.

 

Diggins, J. P. (1972) ‘Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America’. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

Dilks, D. (1971) ‘Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945’. London: Cassell and Co.

 

Dresler, A. (1924) ‘Mussolini’. Leipzig: Hammer-Verl.

 

Edwards, P. (1971) ‘The Austen Chamberlain-Mussolini Meetings’. Historical Journal. 14(1). Pp. 153-164.

 

Erdmannsdörffer, B. (1869) ‘Graf Georg Friedrich von Waldeck: Ein preussischer Staatsmann im siebzehnten Jahrhundert’. Berlin: Georg Reimer.

 

Esenwein, G., and Shubert, A. (1995) ‘Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939’. London: Longman.

 

Ferguson, N. (2006) ‘The War of the World: History’s Age of Hatred’. London: Allen Lane.

 

Franzi, L. (1939) ‘Fase attuale del razzismo tedesco’. Rome: Instituto Nazionale di Cultura.

 

Frassati, L. (1985) ‘Il destino passa per Varsavia’. Milan: Bompiani.

 

Gentile, E. (1989) ‘Storia del partito fascista, 1919-1922’. Bari: Laterza.

 

Gilbert, M. (1976) ‘Winston S. Churchill’. London: Heinemann.

 

Golomstock, I. (2011) ‘Totalitarian Art: In the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, Fascist Italy and the People’s Republic of China’. New York: The Overlook Press.

 

Graham, H. (2005) ‘The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Gramsci, A. (1948) ‘Quaderni del carcere’. Turin: Einaudi.

 

Gregor, A. J. (1969) ‘The Ideology of Fascism’. New York: The Free Press.

 

Gregor, A. J. (1979) ‘Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism’. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

Gumplowicz, L. (1881) ‘Rechtsstaat und Sozialismus’. Innsbruck: Wagner.

 

Gumplowicz, L. (1899) ‘Outlines of Society’. Translated by Frederick W. Moore. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science.

 

Gumplowicz, L. (1909) ‘Der Rassenkampf’. Innsbruck: Wagner.

 

Hegel, G. F. W. ([1821] 1991) ‘Elements of the Philosophy of Right’. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Heiden, K. (1967) ‘Der Führer: Hitler’s Rise to Power’. 2nd Edition. London: Gollancz.

 

Heywood, A. (2012) ‘Political Ideologies: An Introduction’. 5th Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

 

Hoepke, K-P. (1968) ‘Die deutsche Rechte und der italienische Faschismus’. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.

 

Hollander, P. (2017) ‘From Benito Mussolini to Hugo Chavez: Intellectuals and a Century of Political Hero Worship’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Horn, D. (1994) ‘Social Bodies: Science, Reproduction, and Italian Modernity’. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

Huddleston, S. (1938) ‘In My Time’. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.

 

Ignatieff, M. (2014) ‘Are the Authoritarians Winning?’. New York Review of Books. July 10.

 

Isabella, M. (2009) ‘Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

James, L. (1994) ‘The Rise and Fall of the British Empire’. London: Little Brown.

 

James, W. (1955) ‘Pragmatism’. New York: Longman’s, Green & Co.

 

Jarausch, K. H. (1965) ‘The Four Power Pact 1933’. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

 

Jenks, W. A. (1978) ‘Francis Joseph and the Italians, 1849-1859’. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

 

Kershaw, I. (2000) ‘Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation’. 4th Edition. London: Bloomsbury.

 

Kindermann, G-F. (1988) ‘Hitler’s Defeat in Austria, 1933-1934: Europe’s First Containment of Nazi Expansionism’. London: Hurst.

 

Kirkpatrick, I. (1964) ‘Mussolini: A Study of a Demagogue’. London: Odhams Books.

 

Knight, P. (2003) ‘Mussolini and Fascism’. Abingdon: Psychology Press.

 

Knox, M. (1982) ‘Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Knox, M. (2000) ‘Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Knox, M. (2002) ‘Fascism: Ideology, Foreign Policy, and War’. In: Lyttelton, A. (ed.) ‘Liberal and Fascist Italy’. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 105-138.

 

Kühnl, R. (1966) ‘Die nationalsozialistische Linke, 1925-1930’. Mesenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain.

 

Lamb, R. (1997) Mussolini as Diplomat: Il Duce’s Italy on the World Stage. New York, NY: Fromm International.

 

Leoni, E. (1941) ‘Mistica del razzismo fascista’. Padua: Cedam.

 

Ludwig, E. (1932) ‘Colloqui con Mussolini’. Milan: Mondadori.

 

Mack-Smith, D. (1978) ‘Mussolini’s Roman Empire’. New York: The Viking Press.

 

Mack-Smith, D. (1997) ‘Modern Italy: A Political History’. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

 

Maddison, A. (1964) ‘Economic Growth in the West’. London: Allen & Unwin.

 

Marinetti, F. T. (1909) ‘Manifesto of Futurism’. Bologna: Gazzetta dell’Emilia.

 

Melograni, P. (1976) ‘The Cult of Duce in Mussolini’s Italy’. Journal of Contemporary History. 11:4. Pp. 221-237.

 

Michaelis, M. (1978) ‘Mussolini and the Jews: German-Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy, 1922-1945’. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

 

Michaelis, M. (1989) ‘Fascism, Totalitarianism and the Holocaust: Reflections on Current Interpretations of National Socialist Anti-Semitism’. European History Quarterly. 19. Pp. 85-103.

 

Michels, R. (1915) ‘Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy’. Translated by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul. New York: Heart’s International Library Co.

 

Michels, R. (1927) ‘Corso di sociologia politica’. Milan: Istituto Editoriale Scientifico.

 

Milza, P. (1967) ‘L’Italie fasciste devant l’opinion française, 1920-1940’. Paris: Armand Colin.

 

Molfese, F. (1964) ‘Storia del brigantaggio dopo l’unità’. Milan: Feltrinelli.

 

Moradiellos García, E. (2001) ‘El Reñidero de Europa: Las Dimensiones Internacionales de la Guerra Civil Española’. Barcelona: Península.

 

Morgan, P. (1995) ‘Italian Fascism, 1919-1945’. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

 

Mosca, G. (1953) ‘Elementi di scienza politica’. 5th Edition. 2 volumes. Bari: Laterza.

 

Muggeridge, M. (1947) ‘Ciano’s Diary 1939-1943’. London: Heinemann.

 

Mussolini, B. (1928) ‘My Autobiography’. New York: Scribner.

 

Mussolini, B. (1958) ‘Opera omnia di Benito Mussolini’. Volume 26. Florence: La Fenice.

 

Namier, L. B. (1963) ‘Europe in Decay: A Study in Disintegration, 1936-1940’. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith.

 

Neville, P. (2004) ‘Mussolini’. Abingdon: Routledge.

 

Nietzsche, F. W. (1883) Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen’. Chemnitz, Germany: Ernst Schmeitzner.

 

Nietzsche, F. W. ([1878] 1996) ‘Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits’. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Nietzsche, F. W. ([1881] 2007) ‘The Dawn’. Translated by J. M. Kennedy. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

 

Nolte, E. (1965) ‘The Three Faces of Fascism’. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

 

Paul, C. E., and Zaczek, B. (2006) ‘Margherita Sarfatti and Italian Cultural Nationalism’. Modernism/Modernity. 13(1). Pp. 889-916.

 

Payne, S. G. (1995) ‘A History of Fascism, 1914-1945’. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

 

Petersen, J. (1973) ‘Hitler-Mussolini: Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom, 1933-1936’. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

 

Petrie, C. (1940) ‘The Life and Letters of the Rt Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain’. Volume 2. London: Cassell and Co.

 

Phaff, W. (2002) ‘The Bullet’s Song: Romantic Violence and Utopia’. New York: Simon and Schuster.

 

Pisanò, G. (1967) ‘Mussolini e gli ebrei’. Milan: Edizioni FPE Milano.

 

Poliakov, L., and Sabille, J. (1955) ‘Jews under the Italian Occupation’. Paris: Editions du Centre.

 

von Plehwe, F-K. (1971) ‘The End of an Alliance: Rome’s Defection from the Axis in 1943’. Translated by Eric Mosbacher. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Preston, P. (1996) ‘A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War’. London: Fontana Press.

 

Reche, O., and Woltmann, L. (1936) ‘Woltmanns werke’. Leipzig: Justus Dorner Verlag.

 

Regele, O. (1964) ‘Feldmarschall Radetzky: Leben, Leistung, Erbe’. Vienna: Verlag Herold.

 

Ridley, J. (1997) ‘Mussolini’. London: Constable.

 

Rosenberg, A. (1927) ‘Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik’. Munich: Eher.

 

Roth, J. J. (1980) ‘The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians’. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

Row, T. (2002) ‘Italy in the International System, 1900-1922’. In: Lyttelton, A. (ed.) ‘Liberal and Fascist Italy’. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 83-104.

 

Rumi, G. (1967) ‘Tendeme e caratteri degli studi sulla politica estera fascista, 1945-1966’. Nuova Rivista Storica. Jan-Apr 1967. Pp. 149-168.

 

Rusinow, D. I. (1969) ‘Italy’s Austrian Heritage, 1919-1946’. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

Salvemini, G. (1953) ‘Prelude to World War Two’. London: Gollancz.

 

Schmidt, P. (1951) ‘Hitler’s Interpreter: The Memoirs of Paul Schmidt’. London: Heinemann.

 

Schneider, H. W., and Clough, S. B. (1929) ‘Making Fascists’. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

Scirocco, A. (1981) ‘Il Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell’unificazione, 1860-61’. Naples: Società editrice Napoletana.

 

Seton-Watson, C. (1967) ‘Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 1870-1925’. London: Methuen.

 

Shorrock, W. I. (1988) ‘From Ally to Enemy: The Enigma of Fascist Italy in French Diplomacy’. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press.

 

Siebert, F. (1962) ‘Italiens Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg’. Frankfurt: Athenäum.

 

Simons, G. (2004) ‘Iraq: From Sumer to post-Saddam’. London: St Martins.

 

Sked, A. (1979) ‘The Survival of the Habsburg Empire: Radetsky, the Imperial Army and the Class War, 1848’. London: Longman.

 

Sluga, G. (2001) ‘The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth Century Europe’. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

 

Sorel, G. (1908) ‘Réflexions sur la violence’. Paris: Marcel Rivière et Cie.

 

Spender, S. (1971) ‘Foreword’. In: Hamilton, A. (ed.) ‘The Appeal of Fascism: A Study of Intellectuals’. London: Blond.

 

von Srbik, H. R. (1938) ‘Quellen zur deutschen Politik Österreichs, 1859-66’. Volume 5. Oldenburg: G. Stalling.

 

von Starhemberg, E. (1942) ‘Between Hitler and Mussolini’. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

 

Steininger, R. (2003) ‘South Tyrol: A Minority Conflict of the Twentieth Century’. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

 

Sullivan, B. R. (1988) ‘Roosevelt, Mussolini e la guerra d’Etiopia’. Storia Contemporanea. 19(1). Pp. 85-106.

 

Surette, L. (2011) ‘Dreams of Totalitarian Utopia: Modernism and Politics’. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

 

Tannenbaum, E. R. (1972) ‘The Fascist Experience: Italian Society and Culture, 1922-1945’. New York: Basic Books.

 

Toscano, M. (1966) ‘Dal 25 luglio all’8 settembre’. Florence: Le Monnier.

 

Toscano, M. (1967) ‘The Origins of the Pact of Steel’. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.

 

Troost, W. (1991) ‘William III, Brandenburg and the Construction of the anti-French Coalition’. In: Israel, J. I. (ed.) ‘The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Varsori, A. (1978) ‘Italy, Britain, and the Problem of a Separate Peace, 1940-1943’. Journal of Italian History. 1(3). Pp. 467-470.

 

Vigezzi, B. (1991) ‘Politica estera e opinione pubblica in Italia dall’Unità ai nostril giorni’. Milan: Jaca.

 

Villari, L. (1956) ‘Italian Foreign Policy under Mussolini’. New York: The Devin-Adair Company.

 

Vinci, A. (1992) ‘Trieste in guerra: Gli anni 1938-1943’. Trieste: i Quaderni di Qualestoria.

 

Voight, K. (1996) ‘Il rifugio precario: gli esuli in Italia dal 1933 al 1945’. Two volumes. Florence: La Nuova Italia.

 

Volpe, G. (1939) ‘Storia del movimento fascista’. Milan. Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale.

 

Walston, J. (1997) ‘History and Memory of the Italian Concentration Camps’. Historical Journal. 40. Pp. 169-183.

 

Waly, D. (1975) ‘British Public Opinion and the Abyssinian War, 1935-36’. London: Maurice Temple Smith.

 

Wawro, G. (1996) ‘Austria Versus the Risorgimento: A New Look at Austria’s Italian Strategy in the 1860s’. European History Quarterly. 26. Pp. 7-29.

 

Weber, M. (1946) ‘Politics as a Vocation’. Translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Free Press.

 

Whittam, J. (1984) ‘Fascist Italy’. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

 

Wright, O. J. (2015) ‘Conforming to the British Model? “Official” British Perspectives on the New Italy’. In: Carter, N. (ed.) ‘Britain, Ireland and the Italian Risorgimento’. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 151-178.

 

 

 

[1] Lamb, R. (1997) Mussolini as Diplomat: Il Duce’s Italy on the World Stage. New York, NY: Fromm International.

[2] Bellamy, R. (2014) ‘Croce, Gramsci, Bobbio, and the Italian Political Tradition’. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press; Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Heywood, A. (2012) ‘Political Ideologies: An Introduction’. 5th Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Roth, J. J. (1980) ‘The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians’. Berkeley: University of California Press.

[3] Hollander, P. (2017) ‘From Benito Mussolini to Hugo Chavez: Intellectuals and a Century of Political Hero Worship’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[4] De Felice, R. (1952) ‘Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo’. Turin: Einaudi;

De Felice, R. (1971) ‘Le interpretazioni del fascismo’. Bari: Laterza; De Felice, R. (1981) ‘Mussolini il Duce, Vol. II: Lo stato totalitario, 1936-1940’. Turin: Einaudi; De Felice, R. (1988) ‘Storia degli ebrei Italiani sotto il fascismo’. 4th Edition. Turin: Einaudi; Villari, L. (1956) ‘Italian Foreign Policy under Mussolini’. New York: The Devin-Adair Company.

[5] Gregor, A. J. (1969) ‘The Ideology of Fascism’. New York: The Free Press; Payne, S. G. (1995) ‘A History of Fascism, 1914-1945’. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press; Row, T. (2002) ‘Italy in the International System, 1900-1922’. In: Lyttelton, A. (ed.) ‘Liberal and Fascist Italy’. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 83-104.

[6] Beevor, A. (1982) ‘The Spanish Civil War’. London: Orbis Publishing; Coverdale, J. F. (1976) ‘Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War’. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Huddleston, S. (1938) ‘In My Time’. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co; Toscano, M. (1967) ‘The Origins of the Pact of Steel’. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press; Varsori, A. (1978) ‘Italy, Britain, and the Problem of a Separate Peace, 1940-1943’. Journal of Italian History. 1(3). Pp. 467-470.

[7] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 15.

[8] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 15.

[9] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Michaelis, M. (1978) ‘Mussolini and the Jews: German-Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy, 1922-1945’. Oxford: The Clarendon Press; Michaelis, M. (1989) ‘Fascism, Totalitarianism and the Holocaust: Reflections on Current Interpretations of National Socialist Anti-Semitism’. European History Quarterly. 19. Pp. 85-103.

[10] Baer, G. W. (1967) ‘The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War’. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Knight, P. (2003) ‘Mussolini and Fascism’. Abingdon: Psychology Press; Ridley, J. (1997) ‘Mussolini’. London: Constable.

[11] Allardyce, G. (1979) ‘What Fascism is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept’. The American Historical Review. 84(2). Pp. 367-388.

[12] Knox, M. (2000) ‘Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Knox, M. (2002) ‘Fascism: Ideology, Foreign Policy, and War’. In: Lyttelton, A. (ed.) ‘Liberal and Fascist Italy’. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 105-138; Morgan, P. (1995) ‘Italian Fascism, 1919-1945’. Basingstoke: Macmillan; Neville, P. (2004) ‘Mussolini’. Abingdon: Routledge.

[13] Morgan, P. (1995) op cit.

[14] Ibid. P. 133.

[15] Ibid. P. 150.

[16] Morgan, P. (1995) op cit. P. 132.

[17] Knox, M. (2002) op cit. P. 110.

[18] Kershaw, I. (2000) ‘Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation’. 4th Edition. London: Bloomsbury. P. 38.

[19] Knox, M. (2002) op cit. P. 143.

[20] Morgan, P. (1995) op cit. P. 133-134.

[21] Knox, M. (2002) op cit. P. 128.

[22] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit. P. 62.

[23] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit.

[24] Ibid. P. 136.

[25] Corner, P. (2002) ‘State and Society, 1901-1922’. In: Lyttelton, A. (ed.) ‘Liberal and Fascist Italy’. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 17-43; Gregor, A, J. (1969) op cit: Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[26] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit. P. 152.

[27] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit.

[28] Heywood, A. (2012) op cit.

[29] Ibid. P. 204; See also: Knox, M. (2002) op cit; Marinetti, F. T. (1909) ‘Manifesto of Futurism’. Bologna: Gazzetta dell’Emilia.

[30] Bellamy, R. (2014) op cit; Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Gumplowicz, L. (1881) ‘Rechtsstaat und Sozialismus’. Innsbruck: Wagner; Gumplowicz, L. (1899) ‘Outlines of Society’. Translated by Frederick W. Moore. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science; Gumplowicz, L. (1909) ‘Der Rassenkampf’. Innsbruck: Wagner; Mosca, G. (1953) ‘Elementi di scienza politica’. 5th Edition. 2 volumes. Bari: Laterza; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[31] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit. P. 105; See also: De Felice, R. (1981) op cit.

[32] Heywood, A. (2012) op cit; Nietzsche, F. W. (1883) ‘Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen’. Chemnitz, Germany: Ernst Schmeitzner; Weber, M. (1946) ‘Politics as a Vocation’. Translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Free Press.

[33] Hollander, P. (2017) op it. P. 82; See also: Michels, R. (1915) ‘Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy’. Translated by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul. New York: Heart’s International Library Co; Michels, R. (1927) ‘Corso di sociologia politica’. Milan: Istituto Editoriale Scientifico.

[34] Heywood, A. (2012) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[35] Schneider, H. W., and Clough, S. B. (1929) ‘Making Fascists’. Chicago. University of Chicago Press. P. 73; See also: Roth, J. J. (1980) op cit.

[36] Nietzsche, F. W. ([1878] 1996) ‘Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits’. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Nietzsche, F. W. ([1881] 2007) ‘The Dawn’. Translated by J. M. Kennedy. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

[37] Bellamy, R. (2014) op cit; Bergson, H. ([1907] 1911) ‘Creative Evolution’. Translated by A. Mitchell. New York: Henry Holt & Company; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[38] Roth, J. J. (1980) op cit. P. 49.

[39] D’Aroma, N. (1958) ‘Mussolini segreto’. Rocca San Casciano: Cappelli. P. 127.

[40] Ludwig, E. (1932) ‘Colloqui con Mussolini’. Milan: Mondadori. P. 119.

[41] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit. P. 120.

[42] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit.

[43] De Begnac, Y. (1950) ‘Palazzo Venezia: Storia di un regime’. Rome: La Rocca.

[44] Sorel, G. (1908) ‘Réflexions sur la violence’. Paris: Marcel Rivière et Cie; See also: Roth, J. J. (1980) op cit.

[45] Nolte, E. (1965) ‘The Three Faces of Fascism’. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson; See also: Phaff, W. (2002) ‘The Bullet’s Song: Romantic Violence and Utopia’. New York: Simon and Schuster.

[46] Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit. P. 30.

[47] James, W. (1955) ‘Pragmatism’. New York: Longman’s, Green & Co. P. 47; See also: Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit. P. 124.

[48] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit. P. 121; See also: Gentile, E. (1989) ‘Storia del partito fascista, 1919-1922’. Bari: Laterza.

[49] Gramsci, A. (1948) ‘Quaderni del carcere’. Turin: Einaudi; Hegel, G. F. W. ([1821] 1991) ‘Elements of the Philosophy of Right’. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[50] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit. P. 197; See also: Croce, B. (1919) ‘Pagine sparse’. Naples: Laterza; Gregor, A. J. (1979) ‘Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism’. Berkeley: University of California Press; Mussolini, B. (1928) ‘My Autobiography’. New York: Scribner.

[51] Wright, O. J. (2015) ‘Conforming to the British Model? “Official” British Perspectives on the New Italy’. In: Carter, N. (ed.) ‘Britain, Ireland and the Italian Risorgimento’. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 151-178. P. 172.

[52] Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit; Coffey, T. M. (1974) ‘Lion by the Tail: The Story of the Italian-Ethiopian War’. London: Hamish Hamilton; Knight, P. (2003) op cit; Knox, M. (2002) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[53] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 219.

[54] Knight, P. (2003) op cit. P. 82; See also: Coffey, T. M. (1974) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Muggeridge, M. (1947) ‘Ciano’s Diary 1939-1943’. London: Heinemann; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[55] Knox, M. (2002) op cit P. 113.

[56] Neville, P. (2004) op cit. P. 209; See also: Knight, P. (2003) op cit.

[57] Knight, P. (2003) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[58] Knight, P. (2003) op cit. P. 82; See also: Beevor, A. (1982) op cit; Esenwein, G., and Shubert, A. (1995) ‘Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939’. London: Longman; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[59] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 137.

[60] Ibid. P. 255.

[61] Beevor, A. (1982) op cit; Knight, P. (2003) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Morgan, P. (1995) op cit; Vigezzi, B. (1991) ‘Politica estera e opinione pubblica in Italia dall’Unità ai nostril giorni’. Milan: Jaca.

[62] Vigezzi, B. (1991) op cit. P. 111.

[63] Clark, C. (2007) ‘Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947’. London: Penguin Books. P. 52.

[64] Troost, W. (1991) ‘William III, Brandenburg and the Construction of the anti-French Coalition’. In: Israel, J. I. (ed.) ‘The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 322; See also: Clark, C. (2007) op cit; Erdmannsdörffer, B. (1869) ‘Graf Georg Friedrich von Waldeck: Ein preussischer Staatsmann im siebzehnten Jahrhundert’. Berlin: Georg Reimer.

[65] Morgan, P. (1995) op cit.

[66] Knox, M. (2002) op cit.

[67] Chini, C. (2015) ‘Italy and the “Irish Risorgimento”: Italian Perspectives on the Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921’. In: Carter, N. (ed.) ‘Britain, Ireland and the Italian Risorgimento’. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 204-224; Collotti, E. (2000) ‘Fascismo e politica di potenza: politica estera 1922-1939’. Milan: La Nuova Italia; Coverdale, J. F. (1976) op cit; De Felice, R. (1981) op cit; Edwards, P. (1971) ‘The Austen Chamberlain-Mussolini Meetings’. Historical Journal. 14(1). Pp. 153-164; Knight, P. (2003) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[68] Morgan, P. (1995) op cit. P. 134-135.

[69] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[70] Mack-Smith, D. (1978) ‘Mussolini’s Roman Empire’. New York: The Viking Press. P. 10; See also: Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Petrie, C. (1940) ‘The Life and Letters of the Rt Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain’. Volume 2. London: Cassell and Co.

[71] Knox, M. (2000) op cit. P. 146; See also: Knox, M. (2002) op cit.

[72] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit. P. 119.

[73] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[74] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[75] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit; Row, T. (2002) op cit.

[76] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Molfese, F. (1964) ‘Storia del brigantaggio dopo l’unità’. Milan: Feltrinelli; Scirocco, A. (1981) ‘Il Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell’unificazione, 1860-61’. Naples: Società editrice Napoletana; Wright, O. J. (2015) op cit.

[77] Maddison, A. (1964) ‘Economic Growth in the West’. London: Allen & Unwin; Payne; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[78] Knox, M. (2002) op cit. P. 117; See also: Row, T. (2002) op cit.

[79] Knox, M. (2002) op cit. P. 117; See also: Morgan, P. (1995) op cit; Row, T. (2002) op cit.

[80] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 1

[81] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[82] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit. P. 234.

[83] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 164.

[84] Gentile, E. (1989) op cit; Knight, P. (2003) op cit; Knox, M. (2002) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Michaelis, M. (1978) op cit.

[85] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit. P. 243; See also: Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit; Gentile, E. (1989) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[86] De Felice, R. (1971) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[87] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 21; See also: Cannistraro, P. V., and Sullivan, B. R. (1993) ‘Il Duce’s Other Woman: The Untold Story of Margherita Sarfatti, Benito Mussolini’s Jewish Mistress, and How She Helped Him Come to Power’. New York: William Morrow & Co.

[88] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 21.

[89] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[90] Cannistraro, P. V., and Sullivan, B. R. (1993) op cit; Lamb; Paul, C. E., and Zaczek, B. (2006) ‘Margherita Sarfatti and Italian Cultural Nationalism’. Modernism/Modernity. 13(1). Pp. 889-916.

[91] Cannistraro, P. V., and Sullivan, B. R. (1993) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Paul, C. E., and Zaczek, B. (2006) op cit.

[92] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 120.

[93] Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) ‘Mussolini’. London: Arnold; Burgwyn, H. J. (1993) ‘The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy and the Great War, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1915-1919’. Westport, CT: Greenwood; Chini, C. (2015) op cit; Corner, P. (2002) op cit; Heywood, A. (2012) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Morgan, P. (1995) op cit.

[94] Heywood, A. (2012) op cit. P. 201.

[95] Ibid. P. 204.

[96] Knox, M. (2002) op cit. P. 110; See also: Chini, C. (2015) op cit; Morgan, P. (1995) op cit; Row, T. (2002) op cit.

[97] Knight, P. (2003) op cit.

[98] Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[99] Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit; Knight, P. (2003) op cit; Morgan, P. (1995) op cit.

[100] Neville, P. (2004) op cit. P. 209.

[101] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[102] Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[103] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit. P. 228; See also: Diggins, J. P. (1972) ‘Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America’. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Knight, P. (2003) op cit; Milza, P. (1967) ‘L’Italie fasciste devant l’opinion française, 1920-1940’. Paris: Armand Colin.

[104] Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit; Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) op cit; Knight, P. (2003) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Muggeridge, M. (1947) op cit; Morgan, P. (1995) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[105] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[106] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[107] Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit. P. 26; See also: Knight, P. (2003) op cit.

[108] Knight, P. (2003) op cit. P. 86; See also: Bongiorno, J. A. (1992) ‘Fascist Italy and the Disarmament Question, 1928-1934’. New York: Garland Publishing; Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) op cit.

[109] Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit. P. 25.

[110] Jarausch, K. H. (1965) ‘The Four Power Pact 1933’. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[111] Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[112] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[113] Knight, P. (2003) op cit. P. 86.

[114] Coffey, T. M. (1974) op cit. P. 22.

[115] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 3.

[116] Ibid. P. 6; See also: Coffey, T. M. (1974) op cit; De Felice, R. (1988) op cit; Knight, P. (2003) op cit.

[117] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Whittam, J. (1984) ‘Fascist Italy’. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

[118] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 58.

[119] Knight, P. (2003) op cit.

[120] For Churchill. See: Gilbert, M. (1976) ‘Winston S. Churchill’. London: Heinemann; For Mesopotamia. See: Ferguson, N. (2006) ‘The War of the World: History’s Age of Hatred’. London: Allen Lane; James, L. (1994) ‘The Rise and Fall of the British Empire’. London: Little Brown; Simons, G. (2004) ‘Iraq: From Sumer to post-Saddam’. London: St Martins.

[121] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[122] Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[123] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[124] Beevor, A. (1982) op cit: Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[125] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 124; See also: Coverdale, J. F. (1976) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[126] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 8.

[127] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[128] Ibid.

[129] Ibid. P. 158.

[130] Beevor, A. (1982) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[131] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 15; See also: Beevor, A. (1982) op cit; Cross, J. A. (1977) ‘Sir Samuel Hoare: A Political Biography’. London: Cape.

[132] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[133] Ibid. P. 166.

[134] Avon, Earl of. (1962) ‘Memoirs: Facing the Dictators’. London: Cassell and Co; Dilks, D. (1971) ‘Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945’. London: Cassell and Co; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[135] Adamthwaite, A. P. (1977) ‘The Making of the Second World War’. London: Allen & Unwin; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[136] Knight, P. (2003) op cit. P. 84.

[137] Huddleston, S. (1938) op cit. Pp. 350-352.

[138] Graham, H. (2005) ‘The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction’. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Knight, P. (2003) op cit; Knox, M. (2002) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Preston, P. (1996) ‘A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War’. London: Fontana Press.

[139] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[140] Graham, H. (2005) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[141] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 257; See also: Beevor, A. (1982) op cit.

[142] Beevor, A. (1982) op cit; Casanova, J. (2013) ‘The Spanish Civil War’. London: I. B. Tauris; Esenwein, G., and Shubert, A. (1995) op cit; Moradiellos García, E. (2001) ‘El Reñidero de Europa: Las Dimensiones Internacionales de la Guerra Civil Española’. Barcelona: Península.

[143] Beevor, A. (1982) op cit; Graham, H. (2005) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[144] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 231; See also: Graham, H. (2005) op cit.

[145] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 185; See also: Allardyce, G. (1979) op cit; Casanova, J. (2013) op cit; Neville, P. (2004) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[146] Knox, M. (2002) op cit. P. 129.

[147] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit. P. 242; See also: Ridley, J. (1997) op cit.

[148] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit. P. 252.

[149] De Begnac, Y. (1950) op cit; De Felice, R. (1952) op cit; Michaelis, M. (1978) op cit; Michaelis, M. (1989) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[150] De Felice. (1952) op cit. P. 511; See also: Blass, S. (1940) ‘Der Rassegedanke: Seine biologische und philosophische Grundlegung’. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt; Dresler, A. (1924) ‘Mussolini’. Leipzig: Hammer-Verlag; Heiden, K. (1967) ‘Der Führer: Hitler’s Rise to Power’. 2nd Edition. London: Gollancz; Kühnl, R. (1966) ‘Die nationalsozialistische Linke, 1925-1930’. Mesenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain; Ridley, J. (1997) op cit; Rosenberg, A. (1927) ‘Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik’. Munich: Eher.

[151] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit. P. 240; See also: De Begnac, Y. (1950) op cit; Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Pisanò, G. (1967) ‘Mussolini e gli ebrei’. Milan: Edizioni FPE Milano.

[152] Ludwig, E. (1932) op cit. P. 71-73; See also: Bullock, A. (1952) ‘Hitler: A Study in Tyranny’. Watford: Odhams Press; Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit; Reche, O., and Woltmann, L. (1936) ‘Woltmanns werke’. Leipzig: Justus Dorner Verlag.

[153] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit. P. 277; See also: Binchy, D. A. (1941) ‘Church and State in Fascist Italy’. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs; Capasso, A. (1942) ‘Idee chiare sul razzismo’. Rome: Augustea; Franzi, L. (1939) ‘Fase attuale del razzismo tedesco’. Rome: Instituto Nazionale di Cultura; Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Leoni, E. (1941) ‘Mistica del razzismo fascista’. Padua: Cedam; Muggeridge, M. (1947) op cit; Volpe, G. (1939) ‘Storia del movimento fascista’. Milan: Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale.

[154] Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) op cit; Capogreco, C. S. (1987) ‘Ferramonti: la vita e gli uomini del più grande camp d’internamento fascista, 1940-1945’. Florence: Giuntina; Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Michaelis, M. (1978) op cit; Voight, K. (1996) ‘Il rifugio precario: gli esuli in Italia dal 1933 al 1945’. Two volumes. Florence: La Nuova Italia; Walston, J. (1997) ‘History and Memory of the Italian Concentration Camps’. Historical Journal. 40. Pp. 169-183.

[155] Carpi, D. (1977) ‘The Rescue of Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia’. In: Gutman, Y. (ed.) ‘Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust: Proceedings of the Second Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, April 1974’. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem; De Felice, R. (1988) op cit; Michaelis, M (1978) op cit; Morgan, P. (1995) op cit; Poliakov, L., and Sabille, J. (1955) ‘Jews under the Italian Occupation’. Paris: Editions du Centre; Ridley, J. (1997) op cit.

[156] Michaelis, M. (1978) op cit. P. 414.

[157] Alonso, A. M. (1994) ‘The Politics of Space, Time, and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity’. Annual Review of Anthropology. 23. Pp. 379-405; Balibar, E. (1990) ‘Paradoxes of Universality’. In: Goldberg, D. T. (ed.) ‘Anatomy of Racism’. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Pp. 283-294; Heywood, A. (2012) op cit.

[158] Apih, E. (1966) ‘Italia: fascismo e antifascismo nella Venezia Giulia, 1918-1943’. Bari: Laterza; Rusinow, D. I. (1969) ‘Italy’s Austrian Heritage, 1919-1946’. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Sluga, G. (2001) ‘The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth Century Europe’. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

[159] Salvemini, G. (1953) ‘Prelude to World War Two’. London: Gollancz; Sluga, G. (2001) op cit.

[160] Steininger, R. (2003) ‘South Tyrol: A Minority Conflict of the Twentieth Century’. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. P. 49-51.

[161] Vinci, A. (1992) ‘Trieste in guerra: Gli anni 1938-1943’. Trieste: i Quaderni di Qualestoria.

[162] De Felice, R. (1988) op cit; Michaelis, M. (1978) op cit; Michaelis, M. (1989) op cit.

[163] Horn, D. (1994) ‘Social Bodies: Science, Reproduction, and Italian Modernity’. Princeton: Princeton University Press; De Grazia, V. (1992) ‘How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922-1945’. Berkeley: University of California Press.

[164] Italian journalist Livio Ragusin-Righi. Cited in: Sluga, G. (2001) op cit. P. 54.

[165] Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) op cit; Frassati, L. (1985) ‘Il destino passa per Varsavia’. Milan: Bompiani; Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit.

[166] Neville, P. (2004) op cit.

[167] De Felice. (1988) op cit; Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[168] Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) op cit; Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Heywood, A. (2012) op cit; Michaelis, M. (1978) op cit.

[169] Michaelis, M. (1978) op cit. P. 9.

[170] Knox, M. (2000) op cit. P. 142; See also: Knox, M. (2002) op cit.

[171] Apih, E. (1966) op cit. P. 223; See also: Rusinow, D. (1969) op cit; Steininger, R. (2003) op cit.

[172] Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit; Knox, M. (2002) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Row, T. (2002) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[173] von Srbik, H. R. (1938) ‘Quellen zur deutschen Politik Österreichs, 1859-66’. Volume 5. Oldenburg: G. Stalling. P. 2760; See also: Jenks, W. A. (1978) ‘Francis Joseph and the Italians, 1849-1859’. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press; Regele, O. (1964) ‘Feldmarschall Radetzky: Leben, Leistung, Erbe’. Vienna: Verlag Herold; Sked, A. (1979) ‘The Survival of the Habsburg Empire: Radetsky, the Imperial Army and the Class War, 1848’. London: Longman; Wawro, G. (1996) ‘Austria Versus the Risorgimento: A New Look at Austria’s Italian Strategy in the 1860s’. European History Quarterly. 26. Pp. 7-29.

[174] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[175] Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit. P. 41; See also: Kindermann, G-F. (1988) ‘Hitler’s Defeat in Austria, 1933-1934: Europe’s First Containment of Nazi Expansionism’. London: Hurst; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Mussolini, B. (1958) ‘Opera omnia di Benito Mussolini’. Volume 26. Florence: La Fenice.

[176] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[177] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 207.

[178] Michaelis, M. (1989) op cit. P. 94; See also: Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) op cit.

[179] Michaelis, M. (1989) op cit.

[180] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 2; See also: Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[181] Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) op cit. P. 189; See also: Hoepke, K-P. (1968) ‘Die deutsche Rechte und der italienische Faschismus’. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag; von Starhemberg, E. (1942) ‘Between Hitler and Mussolini’. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

[182] Baer, G. W. (1967) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[183] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; von Starhemberg, E. (1942) op cit.

[184] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 4.

[185] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Toscano, M. (1966) ‘Dal 25 luglio all’8 settembre’. Florence: Le Monnier; Toscano, M. (1967) op cit.

[186] Bastianini, G. (1959) ‘Uomini, cose, fatti: Memorie di un ambasciatore’. Milan: Edizioni Vitagliano. P. 159; See also: von Plehwe, F-K. (1971) ‘The End of an Alliance: Rome’s Defection from the Axis in 1943’. Translated by Eric Mosbacher. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[187] Knox, M. (2000) op cit. P. 142.

[188] Knox, M. (2000) op cit; Knox, M. (2002) op cit.

[189] Morgan, P. (1995) op cit. P. 180.

[190] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit. P. 233; See also: Knox, M. (2002) op cit.

[191] Bracher, K. D. (1969) ‘Die deutsche Diktatur’. Berlin: Verlag Ullstein GmbH; Mack-Smith, D. (1997) ‘Modern Italy: A Political History’. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Namier, L. B. (1963) ‘Europe in Decay: A Study in Disintegration, 1936-1940’. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith; Petersen, J. (1973) ‘Hitler-Mussolini: Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom, 1933-1936’. Tübingen: Niemeyer; Rumi, G. (1967) ‘Tendeme e caratteri degli studi sulla politica estera fascista, 1945-1966’. Nuova Rivista Storica. Jan-Apr 1967. Pp. 149-168; Siebert, F. (1962) ‘Italiens Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg’. Frankfurt: Athenäum.

[192] Michaelis, M. (1989) op cit. P. 99; See also: Kershaw, I. (2000) op cit.

[193] Gregor, A. J. (1969) op cit; Tannenbaum, E. R. (1972) ‘The Fascist Experience: Italian Society and Culture, 1922-1945’. New York: Basic Books.

[194] Mack-Smith, D. (1978) op cit. Pp. 44-58.

[195] Allardyce, G. (1979) op cit. P. 370.

[196] Morgan, P. (1995) op cit; Ridley, J. (1997) op cit; Vigezzi, B. (1991) op cit.

[197] Knox, M. (1982) ‘Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[198] Hollander, P. (2017) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[199] Allardyce, G. (1979) op cit. P. 370; See also: Bracher, K. D. (1969) op cit.

[200] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit.

[201] Bracher, K. D. (1976) ‘The Role of Hitler: Perspectives of Interpretation’. In: Laqueur, W. (ed.) ‘Fascism: A Reader’s Guide’. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp. 217-223; Golomstock, I. (2011) ‘Totalitarian Art: In the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, Fascist Italy and the People’s Republic of China’. New York: The Overlook Press; Heywood, A. (2012) op cit.

[202] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 211; See also: Avon, Earl of (1962) op cit.

[203] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Neville, P. (2004) op cit.

[204] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 190.

[205] De Felice, R. (1981) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Muggeridge, M. (1947) op cit; Payne, S.G. (1995) op cit.

[206] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 12; See also: Knight, P. (2003) op cit.

[207] Muggeridge, M. (1947) op cit. P. 123.

[208] Schmidt, P. (1951) ‘Hitler’s Interpreter: The Memoirs of Paul Schmidt’. London: Heinemann. P. 83; See also: Muggeridge, M. (1947) op cit.

[209] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[210] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 86.

[211] Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit; Sullivan, B. R. (1988) ‘Roosevelt, Mussolini e la guerra d’Etiopia’. Storia Contemporanea. 19(1). Pp. 85-106.

[212] Diggins, J. (1966a) ‘Flirtation with Fascism: American Pragmatic Liberals and Mussolini’s Italy’. American Historical Review. 71(2). Pp. 487-506. P. 487; See also: Diggins, J. (1966b) ‘Mussolini and America: Hero-Worship, Charisma, and the “Vulgar Talent”’. Historian. 28(4). Pp. 559-585; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[213] Morgan, P. (1995) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[214] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 50.

[215] Bessis, J. (1981) ‘La Méditerranée fasciste’. Paris: Karthala; Shorrock, W. I. (1988) ‘From Ally to Enemy: The Enigma of Fascist Italy in French Diplomacy’. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press; Knight, P. (2003) op cit; Payne, S. G. (1995) op cit; Paul, C. E., and Zaczek, B. (2006) op cit; Roth, J. J. (1980) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[216] Roth, J. J. (1980) op cit. P. 190.

[217] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 239; See also: Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[218] Knight, P. (2003) op cit. P. 87.

[219] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 240.

[220] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Neville, P. (2004) op cit.

[221] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 85.

[222] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[223] Morgan, P. (1995) op cit. P. 149.

[224] Ibid. P. 141.

[225] Knox, M. (2000) op cit; Knox, M. (2002) op cit.

[226] Knox, M. (2002) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Neville, P. (2004) op cit.

[227] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[228] Chini, C. (2015) op cit.

[229] Muggeridge, M. (1947) op cit. P. 27.

[230] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 33.

[231] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 68.

[232] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[233] Waly, D. (1975) ‘British Public Opinion and the Abyssinian War, 1935-36’. London: Maurice Temple Smith; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[234] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[235] Ibid. P. 189.

[236] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[237] Surette, L. (2011) ‘Dreams of Totalitarian Utopia: Modernism and Politics’. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. P. 97; See also: Ignatieff, M. (2014) ‘Are the Authoritarians Winning?’. New York Review of Books. July 10; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; See also: Spender, S. (1971) ‘Foreword’. In: Hamilton, A. (ed.) ‘The Appeal of Fascism: A Study of Intellectuals’. London: Blond.

[238] Diggins, J. (1966a) op cit; Diggins, J. (1966b) op cit; Hollander, P. (2017) op cit.

[239] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 61.

[240] Ibid. P. 39; See also: Seton-Watson, C. (1967) ‘Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 1870-1925’. London: Methuen.

[241] Villari, L. (1956) op cit. P. 101.

[242] Gilbert, M. (1976) op cit. Pp. 224-225; See also: Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[243] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[244] Beevor, A. (1982) op cit; Coffey, T. M. (1974) op cit; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Melograni, P. (1976) ‘The Cult of Duce in Mussolini’s Italy’. Journal of Contemporary History. 11:4. Pp. 221-237.

[245] Kirkpatrick, I. (1964) ‘Mussolini: A Study of a Demagogue’. London: Odhams Books. Pp. 241-243.

[246] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[247] Dell, R. (1940) ‘The Geneva Racket’. London: Robert Hale; Lamb, R. (1997) op cit; Salvemini, G. (1953) op cit.

[248] Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[249] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 189; See also: Villari, L. (1956) op cit.

[250] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 285.

[251] Villari, L. (1956) op cit. P. 41; See also: Neville, P. (2004) op cit.

[252] Arrigoni, C. (1951) ‘La Fortuna editorial delle “Memorie Politiche” di Felice Orsini’. Risorgimento. 3. Pp. 98-99; Bacchin, E. (2015) ‘Felice Orsini and the Construction of the Pro-Italian Narrative in Britain’. In: Carter, N. (ed.) ‘Britain, Ireland and the Italian Risorgimento’. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 80-103; Isabella, M. (2009) ‘Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era’. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Wright, O. J. (2015) op cit.

[253] Villari, L. (1956) op cit. P. 41.

[254] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit. P. 167; See also: Avon, Earl of. (1962) op cit.

[255] Lamb, R. (1997) op cit.

[256] Ibid; Ridley, J. (1997) op cit; Villari, L. (1956) op cit.